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The Constitution forbids the states from discriminating against non-
residents with respect to commercial activities. Yet, courts have
allowed states to favor residents over non-residents in a number of
ways, such as with respect to public university admissions and
government procurement policies. In this Article, the author offers a
normative theory and doctrinal framework to reconcile these
competing demands of interstate equality and state autonomy.
Specifically, states may favor residents with respect to state
programs funded by state citizens when such discrimination is
necessary to vindicate the citizens' legitimate claim of entitlement to
such taxpayer-funded programs. This "investment capture" defense
is then applied to the various mechanisms states typically use to
favor residents, such as discriminatory tax provisions, government
procurement policies, the distribution of government-owned goods
and services, and the imposition of so-called "downstream
restraints" on private parties who deal with the state.
Several provisions of the Constitution, such as the Dormant Commerce
Clause and Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, forbid the states
from discriminating against non-residents. Yet at the same time, courts have
allowed states to favor residents over non-residents in a number of ways. For
instance, states may limit the number of non-residents who may attend state
universities and/or require them to pay higher tuition fees;1 they can impose
preferences for local vendors and products when purchasing goods or
services for their own use;2 and they can limit the number of hunting licenses
available to non-residents. 3 There are other examples. 4
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I Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 328 (1983).
2 Smith Setzer & Sons, Inc. v. S.C. Procurement Review Panel, 20 F.3d 1311, 1320
(4th Cir. 1994); J.F. Shea Co. v. City of Chicago, 992 F.2d 745, 747-49 (7th Cir. 1993).
3 Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978).
4 See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (permitting state to sell state-
owned cement only to state residents); Chance Mgmt., Inc. v. South Dakota, 97 F.3d
1107 (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding state's residency requirement for licenses to operate
video lottery machines).
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As a doctrinal matter, the Court has attempted to mediate these
conflicting demands of interstate equality and state autonomy through the so-
called "market participant" exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause,
which allows states to favor their residents when the state is acting as a
market participant but not market regulator. That distinction in state roles,
however, has turned out to be difficult to define and apply. Some state
market actions are held invalid,5 while other state activities outside the
market are declared to be permissible. 6 Worse, the Court has failed to explain
exactly what features render a particular state action participatory rather than
regulatory. 7 As both lower courts and commentators have acknowledged,
making sense of the Court's decisions is a daunting task.8
This doctrinal disarray has proven to be fertile ground for academic
commentators. Defending the Court's decisions, several commentators have
argued that a limited market participant doctrine is consistent with the
constitutional commitment to a national common market.9 Although their
analyses differ, they endorse several state activities that favor residents, such
as cash subsidies and state procurement preferences. 10 Meanwhile, other
commentators have suggested that theirs is a fool's errand, arguing that there
is no justification for allowing states to favor residents or in-state business
and that the entire market participant doctrine should be jettisoned. I I Indeed,
in a notably sectarian vein, Chief Judge Gibbons of the Third Circuit
5 South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 99 (1984) (invalidating
contractual condition imposed on sale of state-owned timber).
6 New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 277 (1988) (suggesting that
direct cash subsidy restricted to in-state private businesses is constitutional).
7 Ethan Yale & Brian Galle, Muni Bonds and the Commerce Clause after United
Haulers, 115 TAX NOTES 1037, 1040 & n.34 (2007) (noting that market participant
exception is "undertheorized").
8 GSW, Inc. v. Long County, 999 F.2d 1508, 1511 (1 th Cir. 1993); Swin Res. Sys.,
Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 249 (3d Cir. 1989); Shell Oil Co. v. City of
Santa Monica, 830 F.2d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 1987); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme
Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84
MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1198 (1986).
9 Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market Participant Exemption to the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REv. 395 (1989); Mark P. Gergen, The Selfish State and
the Market, 66 TEx. L. REv. 1097 (1988); Saul Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and
Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REv. 563 (1983); Regan, supra note 8, at 1194; Jonathan
D. Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 487, 491
(1981).
10 See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause,
107 YALE L.J. 965, 1053 (1998) (cash subsidies).
11 Hans A. Linde, Constitutional Rights in the Public Sector: Justice Douglas on
Liberty in the Welfare State, 40 WASH. L. REv. 10, 67 (1965); Karl Manheim, New-Age
Federalism and the Market Participant Doctrine, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 559, 563 (1990).
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dismissed the entire doctrine as a "peculiar eruption of Dixieism," which he
analogized to a "disease."' 12 Still others have focused their criticism more
narrowly on particular forms of state favoritism, such as state business
development incentives, arguing that, as to these measures, discrimination
against out-of-state interests is impermissible. 13
The need for a coherent and comprehensive approach to assessing
governmental favoritism of in-state residents is manifest. As I argue,
considerations of political fairness and public finance efficiency support the
notion that states may reserve exclusively to their own citizens the benefit of
those programs that are funded by state taxpayers and that cannot be shared
equally with non-residents without jeopardizing state citizens' access to such
programs. This "investment capture" defense for the market participant
exception provides a normative justification for state favoritism in the
distribution of many taxpayer-funded goods and services. At the same time,
however, the investment capture model forbids discrimination in the
distribution of goods and services whose creation state citizens have not
funded, such as natural resources like oil or wildlife, or whose distribution to
non-residents on equal terms does not interfere with the ability of residents to
enjoy such benefits, such as roads or courts.
In this respect, the investment capture model proposed here differs from
and is more generous to state authority than the analytical frameworks
proffered by other commentators. Professor Jonathan Varat, for example,
endorses the notion that citizens have a special claim on those assets that the
citizens helped create, but, in his view, that interest only provides a "prima
facie" justification for favoring state residents, which justification can be
rebutted by non-residents in a variety of circumstances, including (most
curiously) when non-residents have a special need for the particular state
good. 14 Similarly, Professor Mark Gergen treats the state interest in favoring
its own citizens as secondary to and limited by the requirement that the state
provide equal access to resources in the market. 15 Meanwhile, Professor Dan
Coenen and I part company on his claim that the market participant
12 Swin Res., 883 F.2d at 257 (Gibbons, C.J., dissenting).
13 Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause
Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REv. 377 (1996).
14 Varat, supra note 9, at 529-31, 533. One might think that, if an individual has a
special need for some state benefit, whatever claim of entitlement that might arise from
such need would be more appropriately directed to the person's own state, at least as to
goods and service not essential to tourists or visitors to a state.
15 Gergen, supra note 9, at 1112-13. As a result, Professor Gergen condemns
downstream restraints and even the Court's decision in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S.
429 (1980), both of which the investment capture model endorses (at least to a limited
extent with regard to the former). See Gergen, supra note 9, at 1142.
2008]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
exception rests upon a host of theoretical considerations. 16 Some of the
considerations he identifies do not support the Court's doctrine, while others
would entail a global and deleterious revolution in Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. These foundational differences lead us to different conclusions
regarding what forms of state favoritism are permissible, most notably with
respect to the legitimacy of downstream restraints. 17 To be sure, there is
much to admire in their groundbreaking and ambitious works, but the
investment capture model offered here provides a more normatively
attractive resolution to the constitutional dilemma.
Part I lays out the doctrinal origins of the market participant doctrine and
the closely related case law regarding monetary subsidies. Part II canvasses
the various theoretical justifications offered by the Court for allowing states
to favor state citizens in the distribution of certain state resources,
illuminating the flaws in each approach. Part III describes the investment
capture defense, demonstrating how considerations of both political justice
and economic efficiency support it. This part then develops a doctrinal
framework for courts to use in implementing the investment capture model.
Building upon this theoretical background, Part IV applies the investment
capture model to the various forms of state favoritism, such as subsidies, tax
exemptions, and state procurement and sales policies.
I. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND PERMISSIBLE
STATE PROTECTIONISM
The U.S. Constitution commits the nation to a common market system.
Yet, at the same time, the Court has acknowledged two instances in which
states may act in a parochial manner, favoring in-state interests at the
expense of out-of-state competitors. First, a state may exercise its proprietary
power over state-owned resources to favor in-state interests. This is the so-
called "market participant" doctrine. Second, a state may subsidize in-state
interests, such as by providing a cash grant to in-state businesses.
A. The Market Participant Doctrine
As the Court has repeatedly admonished, the Dormant Commerce Clause
forbids state actions that "discriminate against" interstate commerce, such as
by restricting the importation of goods from other states or the exportation of
16 Coenen, supra note 9, at 419-41.
17 Compare id. at 473 (condemning downstream restraints "as the general rule") and
Varat, supra note 9, at 564 (same) with Part IV.C.2, infra (accepting downstream
restraints when related to channeling subsidy to residents).
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in-state goods. 18 Such measures are subject to rigorous scrutiny that amounts
to a rule of virtual per se invalidity.19 Applying that rule, the Court has
invalidated numerous state measures that favor local residents at the expense
of out-of-state individuals or businesses. 20 In so doing, the Court has made
real the constitutional promise that, as Justice Jackson put it, "our economic
unit is the Nation." 21
In 1976, however, the Court carved an exception to the Dormant
Commerce Clause's prohibition on state favoritism for residents. In Hughes
v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,22 the Court upheld the State of Maryland's
discriminatory treatment of out-of-state automobile scrap processors. 23 In
order to encourage the disposal of old, inoperative automobiles (defined as
"hulks" by the Maryland statute), Maryland offered a sixteen dollar cash
bounty to scrap processors that processed hulks that had been titled in
Maryland. Both in-state and out-of-state processors were eligible to
participate in the bounty program, but Maryland imposed more onerous
paperwork requirements on out-of-state processors. 24 Maryland's adoption of
this discriminatory paperwork requirement served to encourage towing
companies and other individuals to take abandoned hulks to Maryland
processors. Indeed, one out-of-state processor discovered that the number of
hulks deposited with it by unlicensed wreckers declined by over fifty percent
after Maryland adopted the discriminatory paperwork requirement. 25
18 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336-37 (1979); Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978).
19 The state must demonstrate that its discriminatory regulation serves a legitimate,
non-protectionist purpose and that there are no equally effective, non-discriminatory
alternatives available to serve such goal. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan
Dep't of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353, 359 (1992); Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337. In only one
case has the Court concluded that a state made the requisite showing. Maine v. Taylor,
477 U.S. 131, 151-52 (1986) (upholding state ban on importation of live baitfish from
other states).
20 Norman R. Williams, The Commerce Clause and the Myth of Dual Federalism,
54 UCLA L. REv. 1847, 1906 n.301 (2007) (collecting cases).
21 H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 537 (1949); see also Richard B.
Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 45 (1988)
("Economic union was unquestionably a principal aim of the framers.").
22 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
23 Id. at 809-10.
24 Both in-state and out-of-state processors had to submit documentation of title to
the vehicles in order to receive the bounty, but in-state processors only had to submit a
simple "indemnity agreement" signed by the individual who had deposited the vehicle
with the processor attesting to his ownership of the vehicle. Out-of-state processors, in
contrast, had to submit verifiable title to the vehicle, such as a certificate of title, police
certificate, or bill of sale from a police auction. Id. at 801.
25 Id. at 802 n.12.
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Upholding the Maryland policy, the Supreme Court ruled that the
Maryland policy was immune from Dormant Commerce Clause challenge
because it was not regulatory in nature. As a formal matter, towing
companies and other individuals could still take Maryland hulks to Virginia
processors, though they would not receive the bounty if they did so. As the
Court put it, "Maryland has not sought to prohibit the flow of hulks, or to
regulate the conditions under which it may occur. Instead, it has entered into
the market itself to bid up their price." 26 And, in the Court's view, "[n]othing
in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State ... from
participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens
over others." 27 In short, the dormant Commerce Clause applied to the state
when acting as a market regulator but not as a market participant.
The Court's cursory discussion, however, did little to define the
difference between regulatory actions and "market participant" actions. Take,
for example, tax exemptions or credits for in-state businesses. On the one
hand, they are akin to an impermissible tariff because they distort the
competitive relationship between in-state and out-of-state businesses. Yet,
tax exemptions or credits could also potentially be viewed (like the subsidy
in Alexandria Scrap) as equivalent to a state purchase of the exempted item.
Indeed, it is hard to imagine that the result in Alexandria Scrap would have
differed had Maryland chosen to provide a sixteen dollar tax credit against
the state income tax to in-state processors for each hulk.
Or take state licensing decisions. Much of what state and local
governments do today is provide licenses to individuals and businesses to
engage in their line of work.28 On the one hand, a state's refusal to issue
licenses to non-residents could be viewed as regulatory in nature because the
state is affecting the composition of the market-denying a license prevents
that person or business from engaging in transactions with other individuals
just as completely as a statutory prohibition would.29 On the other hand, state
and local governments often charge fees for licenses, making the issuance of
licenses look more like the sale of a government-owned asset and therefore
26 Id. at 806.
2 7 1d. at 810.
28 Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 734 (1964).
29 See, e.g., Conservation Force, Inc. v. Manning, 301 F.3d 985, 993-95 (9th Cir.
2002) (treating discriminatory denial of hunting license as regulatory); USA Recycling,
Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1282 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that town's denial
of garbage hauling licenses to all but favored hauler was regulatory action); GSW, Inc. v.
Long County, 999 F.2d 1508, 1513 (1 1th Cir. 1993) (holding that rescission of a contract
with a private landfill, which obligated the county to issue a license to the landfill
operator, was regulatory action).
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participatory in nature.3° The Court's perfunctory analysis in Alexandria
Scrap did little to illuminate the proper characterization of these state
measures.
. In any event, Alexandria Scrap opened the door to state protectionism in
the distribution of state assets. In Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,31 the Court upheld
South Dakota's decision to restrict the sale of cement from its state-owned
cement plant exclusively to South Dakota residents. 32 The South Dakota
policy had a devastating effect on an out-of-state construction firm that had
traditionally purchased its cement from the South Dakota plant, but that
impact was immaterial to the Court. Alexandria Scrap, the Court wrote, had
distinguished between "States as market participants and States as market
regulators,"33 and, because South Dakota was selling cement that it had
manufactured at a state-owned plant, it "unquestionably" fit within the
market participant exception.34 Likewise, in White v. Massachusetts Council
of Construction Employers, Inc.,35 the Court upheld a City of Boston policy
requiring all contractors on city-funded construction projects to employ a
specified percentage of city residents on the public works.36 Once again, the
Court was categorical: because the City was spending its own funds, it was
acting as a market participant, not as a market regulator.37 The extent of the
impact on non-residents was beside the point as a legal matter.38
Moreover, White extended the market participant exception in one
potentially troubling respect. Unlike the program at issue in Reeves, in which
the State itself chose to deal only with in-state residents, the Boston program
required city contractors to prefer local residents in their dealings. The City
was not itself favoring local businesses; it was requiring the businesses with
30 Cf Chance Mgmt., Inc. v. South Dakota, 97 F.3d 1107, 1113 (8th Cir. 1996)
(holding that State's use of a discriminatory licensing policy when applied to its own
activities did not fall outside the market participant exception). Of course, the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV provides some protection against discriminatory
licensing denials. See Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 288
(1985) (holding that State's denial of bar licenses to non-residents violated Article IV
Privileges & Immunities Clause). Not all state licenses, however, involve privileges or
immunities protected by Article IV. See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S.
371, 388 (1978) (holding that State's denial of elk hunting license did not implicate
privilege or immunity).
31 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
3 2 1d. at 441.
3 3 Id. at 436.
34Id. at 440.
35 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
3 6 Id. at 205-06.
37 1d. at 215.
38 Id. at 209-10.
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which it dealt to favor local residents. Stated differently, the required
favoritism was "downstream. '39
The potential implications for the national economy were enormous.
Many companies, including some of the nation's largest, contract with state
and local governments. If a state could require as a condition of doing
business with the state that all public contractors prefer local residents-such
as by hiring only local employees or purchasing goods and services only
from local vendors-the state could effectively leverage its purchasing power
to achieve protectionist gains for local residents. What the state could not
achieve via regulation it could impose by contractual condition.
To be sure, the Court in White acknowledged this danger, but its
response was far from reassuring. Although it suggested that there were
"some limits" on the ability of a state to impose downstream restraints, the
Court declared that formal privity of contract was not among them. 40 In other
words, a state could require other private entities to favor local residents that
were not themselves in privity with the state, at least in some undefined
instances. In this particular case, the downstream local hiring preference was
acceptable, according to the Court, because the favored local workers were
"in a substantial if informal sense, working for the city."4 1
Just one year after White, however, the Court retreated from its broad
endorsement of the validity of downstream restraints. In South-Central
Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke,42 the Court invalidated the State of
Alaska's requirement that private parties that purchased timber from the
State must process the timber in-state. 43 The requirement was imposed by
contract only on parties that voluntarily did business with the state by
purchasing state-owned timber and was designed to assist Alaska's
struggling timber processing industry.44 Alaska defended its policy on the
ground that White had validated such downstream favoritism.45 A plurality of
the Court disagreed, holding that the market participant exception did not
encompass state efforts to control the activities of purchasers of state-owned
goods outside the market in which the state participates. 46
While White had acknowledged that privity of contract was not
necessary to validate a contractually-imposed local preference, the plurality
declared that neither was privity sufficient: "Contrary to the State's
39 Coenen, supra note 9, at 463.
40 White, 460 U.S. at 211 n.7.
41 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
42 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
43 Id. at 84 (plurality opinion).
44 Id. at 84-85, 88-89.
45 Id. at 91.
46 Id. at 97-98.
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contention, the doctrine is not carte blanche to impose any conditions that
the State has the economic power to dictate, and does not validate any
requirement merely because the State imposes it upon someone with whom it
is in contractual privity. ''47 Rather, a state may require favoritism only
"within the market in which it is a participant;" it may not impose conditions
"that have a substantial regulatory effect outside of that particular market. '48
Indeed, the plurality defended its new limit as necessary to ensure that states
did not leverage their control over state-owned resources to require everyone
doing business with the state to favor local residents in other aspects of their
businesses or lives.49
Lastly, in its most recent pronouncements on the market participant
exception, the Court has clarified one of the unanswered questions left by
Alexandria Scrap-namely, whether discriminatory tax exemptions and
credits qualify for the market participant exception. The short answer: they
don't. In New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach,50 the Court unanimously
rejected Ohio's claim that its tax credit for ethanol manufactured in the state
fell within the market participant exception. As the Court noted, Ohio had
not purchased the ethanol for its own account or use; rather, the tax credit
involved the "assessment and computation of taxes-a primeval
governmental activity."' 51 As such, Ohio's action "cannot plausibly be
analogized to the activity of a private purchaser. ' 52 Similarly, in Camps
4 7 Id. at 97.
48 Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 97. As anyone familiar with American antitrust law knows,
markets are neither self-defining nor mutually exclusive. Alaska could be said to be
participating in the raw timber market, the timber market generally, and/or, most broadly,
the wood products market. The validity of the Alaska policy turned upon exactly how the
Court defined the relevant market. As one might expect, lower courts have struggled to
determine and define the contours of the relevant market in which the state is a
participant. Compare Brooks v. Vassar, 462 F.3d 341, 359 (2006) (stating that state-
owned liquor stores are participant in the retail wine market), with id. at 363 (Goodwin,
J., concurring and dissenting) (stating that state-owned liquor stores are participants only
in the wine-and-liquor market).
49 Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 97-98 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 99 (noting that the
State was not "merely choosing its own trading partners" but "attempting to govern the
private, separate economic relationships of its trading partners").
50 486 U.S. 269, 277 (1988).
51 Id.
52 Id. at 278. This brusque rejection of Ohio's claim, however, suggested that the
market participant exception did not extend to subsidies of in-state businesses and applied
only to state purchases of private goods for its own end use. If so, Alexandria Scrap was
wrongly decided. Maryland, after all, had not purchased or taken title to the hulks. Yet,
the Court was not prepared to overrule Alexandria Scrap and hold that end use by the
state was necessary. Rather, the Court confined Alexandria Scrap largely to its facts,
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Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison,53 the Court struck down
Maine's discriminatory property tax exemption for charitable
o!rganizations. 54 The Maine law limited the exemption only to charitable
organizations that provided services principally for the benefit of in-state
residents. Rejecting Maine's defense that it was in effect just purchasing
services from the charitable organizations for the benefit of Maine residents,
the Court tersely declared that "[a] tax exemption is not the sort of direct
state involvement in the market that falls within the market-participation
doctrine." 55
B. Subsidies
Closely related to the'market participant exception is the issue whether
states may offer subsidies to in-state businesses. The Court has assumed but
never squarely decided that cash subsidies to in-state businesses are
permissible. 56 Pure cash subsidies, however, are unusual.57 Much more
common are tax exemptions for favored in-state industries or business
development incentives designed to encourage multi-state businesses to open
or expand their in-state presence. 58 The latter often come in the form of an
declaring enigmatically that "subsidy programs unlike that of Alexandria Scrap might not
be characterized as proprietary." Id. at 277.
53 520 U.S. 564 (1997).
54 Id. at 568-71.
55 Id. at 593. Elaborating, the Court observed that accepting such a tenuous link
between a tax exemption and the allegedly "purchased" goods or services would
effectively swallow the rule against discriminatory tax exemptions since every tax
exemption could be defended on this basis. Id. at 594. Moreover, even if some tax
exemptions could in principle be analogized to a state purchase of the exempted item, this
particular tax exemption could not be so viewed. As the Court pointed out, the breadth of
the exemption-the fact that it applied to all charities regardless of what services they
provided and regardless of whether such services actually benefited the state even in
some indirect fashion-belied the notion that the state was acting in a proprietary role,
purchasing services for the state's benefit from the affected charities. Id.
56 Compare New Energy, 486 U.S. at 278 ("Direct subsidization of domestic
industry does not ordinarily run afoul of that prohibition [on state action designed to give
its residents an advantage in the marketplace].") with W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,
512 U.S. 186, 199 n. 15 (1994) (noting that the Court has "never squarely confronted the
constitutionality of subsidies"). Of course, Alexandria Scrap provides some support for
the constitutionality of such subsidies, but the Court has subsequently construed that
decision as approving a subsidy only when it is fair to characterize the state as purchasing
some good or service from the subsidized business. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520
U.S. at 592. As such, Alexandria Scrap does not bear upon a pure subsidy in which the
state receives no benefit in return.
57 Coenen, supra note 10, at 995.
58 See id.; Enrich, supra note 13, at 382-89.
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investment tax credit against the state income tax or a property tax
abatement. The central focus of the Court's "subsidy" cases has been to
determine whether the particular tax credit or business incentive is more akin
to a (theoretically permissible) cash subsidy or (undoubtedly impermissible)
tariff.59 To date, the Court has yet to uphold a discriminatory tax exemption
or credit.
Discriminatory tax exemptions come in three types: those that disfavor
out-of-state products, those that disfavor out-of-state businesses, and those
that disfavor out-of-state production. 60 Tax exemptions or credits for in-state
goods or services (the first category) present perhaps the easiest case for the
Court and are routinely invalidated. Thus, for example, the Court has
invalidated Hawaii's wholesale liquor excise tax, which exempted some
locally made alcoholic beverages, 61 and Ohio's motor vehicle fuel sales tax,
which granted a credit for ethanol manufactured in the state. 62 As the Court
noted, exempting in-state goods from taxation was equivalent to imposing a
tariff on the out-of-state goods that do not receive the tax break.63
Likewise, the Court has struck down tax exemptions and credits for in-
state residents (category two). For example, in Camps Newfound/Owatonna,
the Court held that Maine's property tax exemption for property owned by
charities violated the Dormant Commerce Clause because the exemption was
available only to charities that primarily served state citizens.64 Because the
practical effect of the measure was to penalize charitable organizations that
served out-of-state residents, the Court viewed the discriminatory tax
exemption as akin to a tariff, this time on out-of-state residents seeking the
assistance of in-state charities.65 Moreover, the Court specifically rejected
Maine's argument that the tax exemption was equivalent to a permissible
cash subsidy to charities that serviced Maine residents. Much like it had done
with respect to Maine's market participant defense, the Court denied that a
tax exemption was analogous as a legal matter to a subsidy.66
59 See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 194-95 (treating subsidy to in-state
dairy farmers funded by milk tax as akin to tariff).
60 Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination and the
Political and Economic Integration of Europe, 115 YALE L. J. 1186, 1195 (2006).
61 Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 273 (1984).
6 2 New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,280 (1988).
6 3 Id. at 276.
64 Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 575, 587-
88 (1997).
6 5 Id. at 580-81.
66 Id. at 590-91 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of New York, 397 U.S.
664, 675 (1970) and New Energy, 486 U.S. at 278); see also id. at 591 (noting that
distinction between exemption and subsidy "is supported by scholarly commentary as
well as precedent").
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Discriminatory tax breaks for companies that open or expand their in-
state activities (category three) present the most difficult case for the Court.
Yet, even here, the Court has been hostile to tax measures that favor in-state
business operations over comparable out-of-state activities. Thus, for
example, the Court invalidated New York's securities transfer tax, which
applied a lower tax rate to transfers made through in-state stock exchanges, 67
and New York's tax credit for Domestic International Sales Corporations,
which applied only to the gross receipts from export products shipped from
New York and not other states.68 As the Court noted, reducing the tax burden
on in-state activities was akin to increasing the tax burden on out-of-state
activities.69
Lastly, even a pure cash subsidy that is funded by a tax on the items
produced by the subsidized industry has run afoul of the Court's prohibition
on protectionism. To assist its dairy farmers, the State of Massachusetts
imposed a tax on the purchase of milk by Massachusetts milk dealers. The
tax was non-discriminatory; it applied to all milk regardless of origin. The
proceeds of the tax were deposited in a special fund, which was then
disbursed to Massachusetts dairy farmers. In West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v.
Healy,70 the Supreme Court invalidated the Massachusetts program.71 The
Court held that, because all of the proceeds of the tax went to in-state dairy
farmers, the tax was effectively imposed only on out-of-state milk and was
therefore "[1]ike an ordinary tariff. '72
West Lynn Creamery's condemnation of the Massachusetts tax-and-
subsidy program, however, potentially called into question whether any
subsidy would survive constitutional scrutiny. As Justice Scalia observed,
every cash subsidy reduces the net tax burden of the benefited local industry
and therefore assists such businesses vis-A-vis their out-of-state competitors
in a way that is functionally equivalent to a tariff on the products of their out-
of-state competitors. 73 Attempting to address this concern, the Court
responded that the key feature condemning the Massachusetts program was
that the subsidy was funded exclusively by a tax on milk. According to the
Court, a pure subsidy funded out of general revenue would not cause
constitutional concern because such a subsidy "imposes no burden on
interstate commerce, but merely assists local business. '74 As Professor
67 Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 336 (1977).
68 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 407 (1984).
69 Id. at 404-05.
70 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
71 Id. at 194.
7 2 Id.
73 Id. at 208-09 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
7 4 Id. at 199.
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Coenen has observed, however, that was hardly an answer at all since every
benefit to in-state industry will feel like a burden to their out-of-state
competitors. 75
Justice Scalia, who concurred in the Court's judgment, took a different,
more formal approach to distinguishing the Massachusetts program from
other, permissible subsidies. As Justice Scalia noted, Massachusetts could
accomplish its desired aim of benefiting in-state dairy farmers through one of
four different types of measures: (1) a tariff on out-of-state milk; (2) a non-
discriminatory tax on milk that is coupled with an exemption or credit for in-
state milk; (3) a non-discriminatory tax on milk, the proceeds of which "are
placed into a segregated fund, which is disbursed as 'rebates' or 'subsidies'
to in-state members of the industry;" or, (4) a cash subsidy to in-state farmers
funded from the state's general revenue.76 According to Scalia, the first two
types of measures were clearly unconstitutional, while the last option of a
pure subsidy funded from general revenues was permissible. 77 That left the
issue of a subsidy from a segregated fund, like the Massachusetts program.
For Justice Scalia, the segregated fund subsidy was more akin to the
impermissible discriminatory tax rebate than the permissible general fund
subsidy:
The only difference between methodology (2) (discriminatory "exemption"
from nondiscriminatory tax) and methodology (3) (discriminatory refund of
nondiscriminatory tax) is that the money is taken and returned rather than
simply left with the favored in-state taxpayer in the first place. The
difference between (3) and (4), on the other hand, is the difference between
assisting in-state industry through discriminatory taxation and assisting in-
state industry by other means.
I would therefore allow a State to subsidize its domestic industry so
long as it does so from nondiscriminatory taxes that go into the State's
general revenue fund.78
Drawing the line between subsidies drawn from a segregated fund and
those funded from the general treasury was, in Scalia's view, "a clear,
rational line." 79
75 Coenen, supra note 10, at 1009; see also W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 208-09
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that every subsidy for in-state businesses
harms out-of-state businesses by neutralizing their competitive advantages).
76 W Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 210 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
77 Id. at 211. Indeed, Justice Scalia correctly observed that Alexandria Scrap had
upheld just such a measure. Id.
78 Id.
79 1d. at 212.
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As the foregoing discussion has revealed, the development of the market
participant doctrine has not been accompanied or supported by a grand
theory that explains the Court's decisions and provides guidance to state and
local lawmakers. What little normative discussion the Court has offered has
been strikingly unsophisticated and incapable of bearing the decisional
weight placed upon it. Indeed, it is perhaps for this reason that so many of the
Court's rulings in this area rest on the identification of the appropriate,
precedential analogy: Whether a particular measure survives judicial review
turns on whether the measure is viewed as more like a tariff or more like a
subsidy, whether it is perceived as more like the measure invalidated in Case
A or like the measure upheld in Case B. Such analogical reasoning and fealty
to precedent is not to be dismissed, but it cannot substitute wholly for a
normative theory to explain why discriminatory state action in any form is
permissible and, if so, to what extent. Absent such a theory, the adjudication
of discriminatory measures will devolve into an arid, intellectual exercise in
which a measure's validity is determined by its similarity to other measures
previously upheld or invalidated by the Court. It is to the search for such
theory that we next turn.
II. THE COURT'S JUSTIFICATIONS FOR STATE PROTECTIONISM
The market participant exception is a doctrine in search of a theory. As
others have noted, different normative justifications for the doctrine have
been offered by the Court at different times.80 As this Part illuminates,
however, none of the proffered theories can both justify the doctrine and
account for its doctrinal limitations.
A. Textual Formalism
As a textual matter, the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to
regulate interstate commerce. One might seize upon the word "regulate" and
argue that the Dormant Commerce Clause therefore only forbids the adoption
of state measures that can be said to regulate interstate commerce. On this
view, other forms of state action are therefore immune from constitutional
challenge as a matter of fidelity to the constitutional text.81 Indeed, in New
Energy, the Court appeared to embrace this view, observing that "[t]he
Commerce Clause does not prohibit all state action designed to give its
80 Manheim, supra note 11, at 580.
81 Coenen, supra note 9, at 436-37.
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residents an advantage in the marketplace, but only action of that description
in connection with the State's regulation of interstate commerce. '82
Of all of the defenses of the market participant doctrine, this is among
the weakest. As an initial matter, the rigid obeisance to constitutional text
upon which this argument rests is inconsistent with the existence of the
Dormant Commerce Clause itself, which-as its critics have repeatedly
emphasized 83-does not appear in the constitutional document. Stated
differently, one cannot accept the atextual Dormant Commerce Clause but
then demand an exception be made to it in the name of the constitutional text.
At the very least, such facial inconsistency in interpretive methodology
demands an explanation why the text should be given weight with respect to
some parts of the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine and not others. Absent
such an accounting, the literalism of this argument resembles self-serving
cherry-picking of interpretive methodologies.
In any event, this textualist defense suffers from a fatal flaw on the
merits: it proves far too much. Limiting the Dormant Commerce Clause only
to those state measures that "regulate" interstate commerce would necessarily
mean that state taxes are therefore immune from Dormant Commerce Clause
attack because taxes are not regulations. 84 Of course, as a normative matter,
it would make no sense to prohibit states from adopting protectionist
regulations but then allow them to adopt discriminatory taxes, such as
tariffs. 85 And, as a matter of Supreme Court doctrine, it is far too late in the
day to argue that the Court should confine its review only to state
regulations. The Supreme Court has applied the Dormant Commerce Clause
to state taxes in numerous cases for well over a century and a half. Indeed,
the very first case in which the Supreme Court invalidated a state measure on
the basis of the Dormant Commerce Clause involved a tax.86
82 New Energy, 486 U.S. at 278 (emphasis removed).
83 See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Me., 520 U.S.
564, 610 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting); General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278,
312 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring); Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce
Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 429-30 (1982); Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent,
The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987
DUKE L.J. 569, 571, 583.
84 The fact that the congressional power to lay taxes and to regulate commerce are
granted in different clauses testifies to this difference. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cls.
1,3.
85 Nor would the Import-Export Clause of Article I prevent such measures. The
Supreme Court has limited that Clause exclusively to tariffs on foreign goods. Woodruff
v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 133-34 (1868); see also Camps Newfound/Owatonna,
520 U.S. at 635-36 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (urging reinterpretation of Import-Export
Clause to cover tariffs on out-of-state goods).
86 See The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 283-84 (1849).
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Perhaps one could attempt to deflect part of this challenge by contending
that some taxes are regulatory in nature (and would therefore be
unconstitutional on this view). Admittedly, there was a time prior to the New
Deal when the Supreme Court invalidated several federal taxes as beyond
Congress's taxation power because, in the Court's view, they were not truly
taxes but instead regulations of commerce beyond Congress's authority to
adopt.87 Even at the time, however, the Court acknowledged the difficulty of
the task,88 and, following the New Deal, the Court abandoned the effort
because, as the Court recognized, there was no principled basis by which to
distinguish between true taxes, whatever they were, and regulatory taxes.89
That history should provide a cautionary lesson for those who would
urge the Court to resurrect that jurisprudence for service in reviewing state
taxes. The most obvious candidate criterion for distinguishing between
regulations and taxes-taxes raise revenue, regulations alter behavior-
founders upon the fact that all taxes alter behavior to some extent.90 On this
view, all taxes are regulations-a position that is inconsistent with the
constitutional text (which, after all, is the centerpiece of this formalist
defense of the market participant doctrine). At the same time and even more
problematically, some of the very measures protected by the market
participant exception also alter behavior and therefore could be said to be
regulatory in nature.91 In short, there is no sound textual basis for treating
taxes but not proprietary actions as constitutionally equivalent to regulations.
Lastly, the textualist defense of the market participant exception cannot
explain Wunnicke's mind-your-own-market limitation on the doctrine.
Alaska had not adopted a regulation but rather had simply disposed of a
state-owned resource by contract. True, Alaska attached the timber
processing condition so as to alter the purchasers' behavior after they took
possession of the timber, but the affected individuals had voluntarily agreed
to that condition by purchasing the timber. It would be strange to label a
private party's voluntary agreement to perform certain tasks pursuant to its
contract with the state as an act of regulation by the state. Indeed, White, in
which the Court upheld just such a voluntarily assumed condition as within
87 See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922).
88 Id.
89 United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 28 (1953).
90 Id. (noting that a federal tax does not cease to be a tax "merely because it
discourages or deters the activities taxed"). Indeed, some tax provisions are intended to
and profoundly do alter behavior. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 401(k) (2000) (providing tax
exemption for retirement contributions so as to encourage retirement savings).
91 For example, the Boston requirement that at least half of the contractor's
workforce be local residents, which was upheld in White, would surely encourage some
contractors to hire more Boston residents than they otherwise would have.
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the market participant exception, implicitly rejected such a view. Moreover,
recall that it was not the fact that Alaska was "regulating" the timber
purchaser's behavior that invalidated the measure. Rather, it was the fact that
Alaska was controlling the behavior of the purchaser in another market.
Perhaps Wunnicke was rightly decided, but, if so, it is not because the
constitutional language "to regulate" distinguishes between intra-market and
extra-market conditions on the sale of timber. In short, the constitutional
language simply cannot bear the weight placed upon it by proponents of this
textualist defense.
B. Economic Functionalism
Perhaps one of the most often proffered defenses of the market
participant doctrine is the notion that state proprietary actions do not
economically harm interstate commerce in the same way or to the same
degree as the adoption of regulations or the imposition of taxes do. The Court
invoked just such an idea in Alexandria Scrap, suggesting that Maryland's
automobile hulk subsidy had not burdened interstate commerce. 92 Likewise,
one Court of Appeals has defended the market participant exception on the
ground that discriminatory market actions do not "establish barriers within
the general market framework that impede interstate commerce." 93
As others have noted,94 this defense of the market participant exception
is poppycock. As an economic matter, there is no qualitative difference
between a tariff on goods produced by out-of-state manufacturers and a
subsidy to in-state manufacturers; both will distort the competitive
relationship between in-state and out-of-state firms by providing assistance to
local businesses. 95 Nor is there any necessary quantitative difference in the
impact of a tariff versus that of a subsidy; indeed, a large subsidy to in-state
firms may be more distortionary and deleterious to interstate competition
92 Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. v., 426 U.S. 794, 808 (1976) ("But until today
the Court has not been asked to hold that the entry by the State itself into the market as a
purchaser, in effect, of a potential article of interstate commerce creates a burden upon
that commerce if the State restricts its trade to its own citizens or businesses within the
State."); see also Levmore, supra note 9, at 584.
93 Smith Setzer & Sons, Inc. v. South Carolina Procurement Review Panel, 20 F.3d
1311, 1318 (4th Cir. 1994); see also Regan, supra note 8, at 1194.
94 Coenen, supra note 9, at 415; Enrich, supra note 13, at 445; Manheim, supra note
11, at 592.
95 Coenen, supra note 10, at 971; Gergen, supra note 9, at 1135; Varat, supra note 9,
at 544; Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax Benefits Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct
Expenditures, 112 HARV. L. REV. 379, 391 (1998).
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than a small tariff on out-of-state goods.96 It is for this reason that
international trade agreements typically limit the authority of national
governments to offer subsidies to domestic industry. 97 Indeed, in Alexandria
Scrap, even the Court acknowledged the practical effect of the measure was
to drastically curtail the number of Maryland hulks processed out of state. 98
In short, whether a state attempts to protect its local industry from outside
competition by levying a tariff on out-of-state goods, providing a cash
subsidy to its local industry, or agreeing to purchase goods only from local
industry at higher-than-market prices, the effect on out-of-state industry is
the same-a loss of competitive position vis-A-vis in-state businesses.
Perhaps one could attempt to rehabilitate this defense of the market
participant exception by arguing that subsidies and other analogous forms of
state action impose burdens on interstate commerce that are qualitatively
different from those imposed by tariffs and discriminatory regulations.
Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion in Alexandria Scrap, attempted
just such an argumentative move. According to Stevens, it was appropriate to
distinguish between "commerce which flourishes in a free market and
commerce which owes its existence to a state subsidy program." 99 In
Stevens' view, the Maryland bounty program created a market for hulks that
would not otherwise exist, and, therefore, Maryland's decision to limit its
subsidy to in-state interests did not burden out-of-state processors in the
sense of taking away something they otherwise would have had. Maryland's
refusal to extend the subsidy to out-of-state business left them no worse off
than had Maryland failed to adopt any subsidy program at all-a policy
choice that would obviously not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. 100
Justice Stevens' approach, however, rests on the discredited distinction
between a burden imposed and a benefit withheld. 101 Even if out-of-state
businesses do not lose any business that they already possessed, their
inability to participate in the new, subsidized market is surely a burden to
them in some sense. 10 2 Moreover, the subsidy is highly likely to generate
96 Coenen, supra note 10, at 1009; cf New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486
U.S. 269, 278 (1988) (noting that cash subsidy is "no less effective [than a discriminatory
tariff] in conferring a commercial advantage over out-of-state competitors").
97 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, The WTO
Agreement, Annex 1A, Results of the Uruguay Round (prohibiting subsidies that cause
"injury to the domestic industry of another Member"); see also Coenen, supra note 10, at
971.
98 Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 806 & n.15 (1976).
99 Id. at 815 (Stevens, J., concurring).
100 Id. at 816.
101 Metro. Life Ins. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 882 (1985) (rejecting distinction).
102 Coenen, supra note 10, at 1009.
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spillover effects, allowing the subsidized in-state businesses to develop new
business or marketing practices that can be used against their out-of-state
competitors in other markets. And, of course, the mere fact that the in-state
businesses are being propped up is something of a harm to their out-of-state
competitors, which might have otherwise succeeded in driving the in-state
companies out of business.
More fundamentally, even if the distinction between a burden imposed
and benefit withheld were a coherent or stable one, the fact that a measure
does not burden commerce in the way suggested by Justice Stevens does not
distinguish subsidies like that in Alexandria Scrap from other, clearly invalid
forms of state protectionism, such as tariffs and embargoes. Under Justice
Stevens' approach, tariffs and embargoes would be permissible whenever the
state could plausibly maintain that out-of-state businesses were not made
worse off. The Court, however, has properly rejected such a defense to
protectionist taxes and regulations.1 03 In short, if there is a difference
between permissible and impermissible forms of state favoritism, it is not
because some types of measures affect interstate commerce differently or to a
less substantial degree than state taxes or regulations do.
C. Sovereignty
A different justification for the market participant exception roots itself
in the special status of states in our federal system. As the Court put it in
Reeves, considerations of state sovereignty and the "role of each State as
guardian and trustee for its people" lend credence to the doctrine.'0 4
Of course, merely pointing to the special status of states in our
constitutional system is insufficient by itself to differentiate the states'
proprietary powers from their regulatory and taxation powers. As Professor
Varat has rightly observed, the states act as guardians for their people in
every aspect of state activity, not just their proprietary ones.105 Thus, were it
true that considerations of state sovereignty justify the state in engaging in
discriminatory market transactions, they would also presumably justify the
state in adopting discriminatory regulations and taxes.
For this reason, proponents of this defense argue in a more limited
fashion that state market transactions are special-that the state has a more
important sovereign interest in the disposition of state-owned resources than
103 See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Diaz, 468 U.S. 263, 269 (1984).
104 Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438 (1980) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
105 Varat, supra note 9, at 506.
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in the regulation or taxation of private individuals. 10 6 Thus, as Professor
Coenen has argued, it is "a greater intrusion on state autonomy to restrict a
state's use of its own tangible resources than to cabin its otherwise limitless
power to coerce through government fiat." 10 7
That assertion, however, is more easily stated than explained. In fact,
subsequent to Reeves, the Court retreated from the notion that state
proprietary actions possess a special constitutional status, at least one
sufficient to insulate them from federal regulation. In two landmark cases
from the 1990s, the Court ruled that the Tenth Amendment-which deals
with claims of state sovereignty-forbids Congress from commandeering
state legislative or executive officials in the service of federal regulatory
ends. 10 8 Yet, when Congress regulated a state's use of its own database,
barring the state from selling the information contained in the state database,
the Court held in Reno v. Condon'0 9 that there was no violation of state
sovereignty. 110 Upholding the federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act
(DPPA), the Court declared "the DPPA does not require the States in their
sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens. The DPPA regulates the
States as the owners of data bases."' I Admittedly, Reno does not say that the
states' proprietary powers are unimportant or may be commandeered in the
service of federal regulatory ends, but it does hold that federal interference
with state choices over how to dispose of state-owned resources does not
raise any special constitutional concerns-a view at odds with that of the
sovereignty defense.
Of course, one might respond that the Court got it wrong in Condon, but
that would illuminate a more profound, normative difficulty with the
argument that the states' proprietary powers are more important to them than
their regulatory and taxation powers: There is no objective basis, at least as a
matter of federal law, 112 for creating a hierarchy of state functions and
106 Smith Setzer & Sons, Inc. v. South Carolina Procurement Review Panel, 20 F.3d
1311, 1321 (4th Cir. 1994) (arguing that barring discrimination in allocation of state
resources would impede resident's receipt of benefits "at the core of state-governmental
responsibility").
107 Coenen, supra note 9, at 427.
108 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992); Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997).
109 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
110 Id. at 143.
111 Id. at 151.
112 State law, of course, may draw such distinctions, but, notably, many states often
treat regulatory and taxation powers as especially intertwined with state sovereignty. For
example, while the management of state-owned resources can often be delegated or out-
sourced to private companies, state constitutions or statutes often prevent states from
delegating their regulatory or taxation powers to private individuals. Of course, state law
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powers. States "own" their regulatory and taxation powers as much as their
proprietary resources. Declaring that the former are less important (or less
bound up with the states' status as sovereign entities) than the latter seems to
rest upon strikingly subjective considerations of the sort that the federal
courts must eschew.
In this vein, it is useful to recall the demise of the "integral governmental
functions" rule of National League of Cities v. Usery.1 13 There, the Court
held that Congress's commerce power did not include the authority to
regulate "integral governmental functions" of the states.1 14 The Court,
however, subsequently overruled Usery in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 1 5 holding in part that the integral
governmental functions rule was both unworkable in practice and unsound in
principle.116 As the Court explained, the line distinguishing between integral
or traditional governmental functions and other state governmental functions
was "elusive at best."' "17 The Court particularly worried that the integral
government functions rule required unelected federal judges to make
unprincipled decisions as to which state functions were sufficiently important
to warrant immunity from federal regulation. 118
Strictly speaking, Garcia does not address the distinction between state
proprietary and regulatory activities.1 19 What Garcia does speak to, however,
is the danger of attempting to identify those aspects of state sovereignty
deserving of constitutional protection. And that danger exists equally
whether a court is being asked to decide that state proprietary powers are
essential to state sovereignty or that operating an airport is an integral
governmental function. 120
does not control the interpretation of the Commerce Clause, but it is at least telling that
many states view their regulatory and taxation powers as more intimately bound up with
their status as sovereign governments than their proprietary powers.
113 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976).
114Id
"1 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
116 Id. at 546-57.
117 Id. at 539.
118 Id. at 545-46.
119 See Swin Res. Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 255 (3d Cir. 1989)
(concluding that Garcia did not undermine market participant exception). But see id. at
260-61 (Gibbons, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that Garcia overturned market participant
doctrine); Manheim, supra note 11, at 611 (same).
120 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 538 (citing Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033,
1037-38 (6th Cir. 1979)). Professor Coenen views Garcia as inapposite additionally
because the problem with the integral governmental function rule was that it denied
Congress the ability to regulate certain aspects of state behavior, whereas the market
participant exception still leaves Congress with the authority to regulate state proprietary
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Lastly, if true, the sovereignty defense would call into question
Congress's affirmative power under the Commerce Clause to regulate state
proprietary activities. If the states' interest in controlling state-owned
resources is so intimately bound up with their identity and status as separate
sovereigns as to make the Dormant Commerce Clause inapplicable, it must
also be true that such sovereignty interest is sufficiently important that
Congress may not overrule it via its affirmative commerce power. As a
doctrinal matter, the Court expressly rejected that latter suggestion in
Condon, but, more importantly, the mere suggestion that' such activities
would be exempt from federal regulations points to the danger of embracing
the sovereignty defense. States no doubt view their decisions about how to
manage and dispose of state-owned resources as vitally important, but that
does not justify exempting such decisions from either congressional
regulation or constitutional scrutiny.
D. Equal Treatment with Private Entities
In contrast to the sovereignty defense, which emphasizes the states'
unique status, this equal treatment defense minimizes the difference between
states and private entities. According to this justification, it is fair to allow
states to favor in-state businesses in their proprietary dealings because
private businesses can choose with whom they wish to deal. On this view, it
is unfair to states to apply the Dormant Commerce Clause to their proprietary
trading relationships because private businesses engaged in similar activities
are not similarly constrained by the doctrine. As the Court put it in Reeves,
"state proprietary activities may be, and often are, burdened with the same
restrictions imposed on private market participants. Evenhandedness
suggests that, when acting as proprietors, States should similarly share
existing freedoms from federal constraints, including the inherent limits of
activities. See Dan T. Coenen, The Impact of the Garcia Decision on the Market
Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 727, 753-
56 (1995). As discussed infra, the sovereignty defense may in fact preclude Congress
from regulating state proprietary activities, thereby raising for the market participant
exception the same counter-majoritarian problem that Usery presented. Even if that is not
the case, though, the fact that Congress could prohibit certain particularly noxious forms
of state discrimination in the distribution of state resources does not mean that the Court
should be free to circumscribe the scope of the Dormant Commerce Clause based on its
own views as to what state powers are truly essential to statehood. Stated differently, just
because Congress could theoretically correct the Court's error does not license the Court
to make the error in the first place.
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the Commerce Clause.' 121 This rationale has drawn considerable and
widespread support.122
Once again, the seeming attractiveness of this justification evaporates
upon closer inspection. To begin with, the mere fact that private businesses
need not comply with the Dormant Commerce Clause does not provide a
sufficient basis for exempting states in their proprietary capacity from its
strictures. Private businesses are not subject to the Equal Protection Clause,
Due Process Clause, or other constitutional provisions, 123 yet no one would
suggest that states, when they act in a proprietary capacity, should be exempt
from these constitutional restrictions too. The states are sovereign
governmental entities possessing enormous power that can be abused if not
checked. As Hans Linde has aptly observed, "[w]hen government serves,
owns, manages, sells, it yet remains government, the object of constitutional
law."'1 24 For that reason, it is not "unfair" to require states to comply with the
Constitution, even if private businesses need not do so.1 25 Indeed, any state
demand to be exempted from constitutional constraints as a matter of equal
treatment with private businesses would come with ill-grace in light of the
fact that states often demand and receive exemptions from federal statutory
restrictions that apply to private businesses. 126
In response, one might argue that even if states are not entitled to a
general exemption from constitutional constraints when they act in a
proprietary capacity, they should receive an exemption solely from the
Dormant Commerce Clause. On this view, the Dormant Commerce Clause
differs from and is less necessary than other constitutional constraints on
state proprietary powers. 127 It is not clear exactly why that might be true, but
121 Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438 (1980).
122 GSW, Inc. v. Long County, 999 F.2d 1508, 1513-14 (11th Cir. 1993); J.F. Shea
Co. v. City of Chicago, 992 F.2d 745, 749 (7th Cir. 1993); Yale & Galle, supra note 7, at
1040.
123 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not apply to private action). The one exception is the Thirteenth
Amendment, which prohibits slavery by private parties as well as states. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIII.
124 Hans Linde, Justice Douglas on Freedom in the Welfare State: Constitutional
Rights in the Public Sector, 39 WASH. L. REv. 4, 8 (1964).
125 See Varat, supra note 9, at 506.
126 The most salient example is the Sherman Antitrust Act. See Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
127 See Coenen, supra note 9, at 421 & nn. 166-67 (suggesting that the Dormant
Commerce Clause may impose less of a restriction on state proprietary action than the
Equal Protection Clause). At the same time, it is not clear that Professor Coenen fully
believes in this defense. He concedes that the defense suffers from several difficulties and
ultimately declares it to be of "limited significance." Id. at 421.
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presumably part of the answer consists of the notion that there is less or no
need for the Dormant Commerce Clause when states are acting in a
proprietary capacity-that states can be trusted to act in a fashion consistent
with the values underlying the Dormant Commerce Clause because, at least
in their proprietary capacity, they will act just like private businesses.
The problem with this more limited variant of the fairness defense is that
states are not just like private businesses when they engage in market
transactions. 128 Private businesses, because they are typically for-profit
entities, have no incentive to discriminate against out-of-state individuals;
indeed, most private businesses desire to sell their goods to out-of-state
customers or to purchase needed supplies from out-of-state sources. It is for
that reason that private businesses often go to the substantial expense of
challenging state regulations and taxes that inhibit such interstate
exchanges. 129
States and local governments, in contrast, do not respond to the profit
motive. At times, states demonstrate a shocking insensitivity to cost
concerns, such as when they purchase goods from in-state vendors at inflated
prices much higher than that offered by out-of-state sources. 130 Rather, states
respond to non-market, political pressures, 131 and, because state political
systems are far more sensitive to in-state residents (because they, unlike out-
of-state individuals, elect the state officials), it is no surprise that states act in
a parochial fashion even in their proprietary dealings. Indeed, the proof is in
the pudding: no private cement producer, for example, would have taken the
action South Dakota did in Reeves, refusing to sell except to in-state
customers at prices lower than that out-of-state purchasers were willing to
pay. It was only because the South Dakota State Cement Commission and
other elected South Dakota officials stood to reap political benefits from the
discriminatory policy that South Dakota adopted it.
In short, even in their proprietary roles-perhaps especially so--states
are likely to act in a parochial fashion. As such, there is no unfairness in
applying the Dormant Commerce Clause to states, even though private
businesses need not comply with its strictures. Businesses are businesses, and
states are states.
128 Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 450 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); Coenen,
supra note 9, at 421; Varat, supra note 9, at 506; see also United Haulers Ass'n v.
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1795-96 (2007) (holding
that public enterprises are not similarly situated to private enterprises).
129 See, e.g., Hughes, 441 U.S. at 324; Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 359.
130 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-35-1524 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 2007)
(providing that state and local governments must purchase in-state goods so long as cost
is no more than seven percent higher than comparable out-of-state goods).
131 Reeves, 447 U.S. at 450 (Powell, J., dissenting); Varat, supra note 9, at 506.
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In sum, none of the theories proffered by the Court withstands scrutiny.
Indeed, the mere fact that the Court has offered so many and has refused to
settle on one or more of these justifications suggests that the Court itself has
reservations about the merits of them. In any event, the weakness of the
Court's proffered theories does not mean that the market participant doctrine
is illegitimate; it only means that the justification for the doctrine must be
found elsewhere.
III. THE INVESTMENT CAPTURE MODEL
Although the Court has not offered a normatively attractive justification
for the market participant doctrine, there is one available: the investment
capture theory. According to this defense, it is permissible for states to
reserve to their citizens those goods and services created by the state because
the citizens are merely receiving the benefits of their investment in the state
government-that they are, in a sense, recapturing their taxes through cash or
in-kind distributions from the state.
A. The Model's Normative Foundations
Allowing states to discriminate against non-residents so as to ensure that
residents receive the benefit of their taxes is justified for two reasons. First,
excluding non-residents from the benefits of state-created goods and services
accords with basic notions of political fairness. States are, after all, political
communities in which citizens decide what services they expect of the state
(e.g., police, schools, medical care for the needy, etc.) and agree to pay for
those services through taxes. Indeed, as Alexander Hamilton acknowledged,
the federal structure created by the Constitution presumes that "the individual
States should possess an independent and uncontrollable authority to raise
their own revenues for the supply of their own wants." 132 On this view, it is
fair for the citizens to decide to restrict the benefits of state-created resources
to state residents because they are the ones who paid for such benefits.
Second, reserving the benefits of state-funded programs to in-state
residents also fosters an optimal degree of public investment. Out-of-state
individuals who receive the benefits of such state-created programs are, in
economic and moral terms, "free riders;" they receive the benefits of
programs for which they have not paid. Aside from its inherent unfairness,
free riding discourages investment both by private businesses and
132 THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 241 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher
Wright ed. 1961).
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governments. 133 No private business would open a restaurant if everyone
,could obtain a meal without paying for it. Similarly, no state wotild choose to
open a public university if every student in the nation were entitled to go
there for free. As one Court of Appeals accurately observed, local residents
"are unlikely to pay for local government services if they must bear the cost
but the entire nation may receive the benefit."' 134
Private businesses solve the free rider problem by charging a user fee for
the good or service and correspondingly excluding those who do not pay the
fee.' For a variety of reasons, however, states cannot or do not want to employ
a system of user fees for all state goods and services. 135 As a consequence,
some governmental goods and services must be and are funded through state
and local taxes, but constitutional limitations restrict the ability of states to
tax non-residents. For example, states may not tax non-residents' income
earned outside the state or their property held outside the state. Only those
non-residents who engage in some taxable activity within the state, such as
by purchasing goods within the state or staying in hotels, are subject to the
state's taxation and then only to the extent of their in-state taxable activity. 136
As one might expect, the actual money earned from non-residents through
these taxes comprises a tiny percentage of each state's total tax receipts.137
Because of the states' inability to tax non-residents, states can only solve
the free rider problem by denying out-of-state residents a ride-that is, by
reserving such publicly-funded programs to state citizens on preferential
terms. Such discriminatory treatment of non-residents rewards state
investment in public goods and, for that reason, is legitimate. 138 Liberated
from the discouraging impact of out-of-state free riders, states are more
133 See Gergen, supra note 9, at 1112.
134 Swin Res. Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1989); see
also Levmore, supra note 9, at 586-587; Regan, supra note 8, at 1194; Varat, supra note
9, at 522.
135 For so-called "public goods," such as police protection, the state is unable to levy
a fee upon those individuals who benefit from the good or service. And, even with
respect to private goods for which a fee can be charged, state residents often get upset
and complain about paying user fees for government services that they believe, rightly or
wrongly, they have already paid for through their taxes.
136 Varat, supra note 9, at 527-28.
137 For example, in 2004 in California, state residents paid $36 billion in personal
income taxes to the state, while non-residents paid only $1.7 billion-or less than 5% of
the state's income tax collection. See California Statistical Abstract, Table D-10 at 84
(2006), http://www.dof.ca.gov/HTML/FSDATA/STAT-ABS/2006_statisticalabstract.
pdf.
138 Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 328 (1983) (upholding state residency
requirement for tuition-free public schooling because it "furthers the substantial state
interest in assuring that services provided for its residents are enjoyed only by
residents"); Gergen, supra note 9, at 1112.
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likely to invest in public programs at an optimal level that reflects their
citizens' collective judgment as to what services they want and are willing to
pay for.
To be sure, the investment capture model-or at least the underlying
notion of political fairness upon which it rests-is not new. Although the
Supreme Court has not rested the market participant exception on this
ground, several lower courts have made fleeting references to the essential
fairness of reserving state-created benefits for state residents. 139 Moreover,
although they draw different doctrinal conclusions from it, academic
supporters of the market participant exception have justified the doctrine on
this basis. Professor Varat has argued that, "[1]ike other groups free to
combine their members' efforts to produce collective benefits to be shared
among the group, political communities, including states, have a prima facie
justification for limiting distribution of their public goods to those who
combined to provide them." 140 More tersely (and prosaically), Professor
Coenen has declared, "the citizens of a state may reap where they have
sown." 141 Even Hans Linde, a critic of the market participant doctrine, has
acknowledged the propriety of allowing states to provide some preferential
treatment for state citizens in distributing taxpayer-funded services on this
basis.142
The principal objection to the investment capture theory concedes the
essential fairness of excluding those who do not pay state taxes from state
benefits but argues that there is not a sufficient linkage between state
citizenship and the payment of taxes to justify treating out-of-state residents
in a discriminatory fashion. This view emphasizes that some non-residents
pay substantial taxes to states in which they do not reside,' 43 while many
residents of states pay no or little taxes. In light of this, it is unfair, so the
argument goes, to deny taxpaying non-residents access to benefits they have
helped fund, while allowing non-taxpaying residents to receive the benefit of
services to which they have not contributed.
139 Smith Setzer & Sons, Inc. v. South Carolina Procurement Review Panel, 20 F.3d
1311, 1323 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting state's legitimate interest in channeling taxpayer
money to state residents); GSW, Inc. v. Long County, 999 F.2d 1508, 1513 (11th Cir.
1993) (noting state's legitimate interest in limiting benefits of state programs to those
"who fund the state treasury and whom the State was created to serve").
140 Varat, supra note 9, at 523.
141 Coenen, supra note 9, at 423.
142 Linde, supra note 11, at 64 (noting that states may charge non-residents higher
tuition at state universities since state citizens have already partially funded their
education through taxes).
143 For example, Connecticut and New Jersey residents who work in New York City
are subject to New York State's income tax on their earnings. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 631
(McKinney 2006).
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Of course, the investment capture defense does not deny that individual
non-resident taxpayers may pay more in taxes than they receive in benefits.
Rather, the investment capture defense simply rests on the fact that residents,
as a class, pay substantially more in state taxes, than non-residents, as a
class, and that, therefore, residency serves as a decent "proxy" for the
payment of taxes and corresponding entitlement to state benefits. 144 Even if
that were not the case, it is far from clear that non-residents' payment of
taxes would be sufficient to entitle them to state benefits. Because non-
residents, unlike residents, can easily avoid taxation by refraining from
visiting or shopping in the state, their payment of such taxes could be viewed
as constituting tacit consent to the fairness of the amount of taxes paid and
benefits received.145
Moreover, it surely cannot be the case that states have a constitutional
duty to make individualized determinations as to which individuals have paid
sufficient taxes to be entitled to state benefits. Adjudicating which non-
residents deserve access to state benefits would be an enormously complex
task fraught with deeply contested issues of political economy. For example,
how much of a disparity between taxes paid and benefits already received is
unfair? Such disparities are an inherent part of any system of taxation. Like
non-residents, wealthy residents may pay much more in taxes than they
receive in benefits, yet no court has ever suggested that individual taxpayers
are entitled to receive public benefits corresponding to the amount of taxes
paid. Such a demanding standard of tax fairness, if applied to residents,
would condemn the modern, redistributive welfare state, and surely non-
residents may not demand greater tax fairness than residents receive. And, if
some disparity is acceptable, how much of a disparity must exist before it is
unfair? The difficulty of answering that question has dissuaded courts from
engaging in individualized accounting even with respect to state citizens. 146
And, not to gild the lily, but even if there were some sufficiently gross level
of disparity that we could all agree is unfair, perhaps the appropriate remedy
would be merely to refund the excess taxes paid rather than award the
particular non-resident equal access to all state benefits.
Given these flaws in the individualized approach to assessing tax
fairness, it is surely not the case that the Constitution forbids states from
making class-wide determinations with regard to who has paid enough in
taxes as to warrant entitlement to state benefits. 147 And, the fact that residents
144 Varat, supra note 9, at 528, 529-30.
145 See id. at 529. Of course, the same might be said of residents, who (as Thiebout
pointed out) can vote with their feet and relocate.
146 Id. at 529 & n.173.
147 Of course, certain classifications would be forbidden by other constitutional
provisions, such as the Equal Protection Clause.
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typically pay more in taxes than non-residents provides a sound basis for
treating residents as possessing a special claim of entitlement to such
benefits. 148
B. Doctrinal Framework
The investment capture defense provides a normatively attractive
foundation for the state to reserve to its citizens some state benefits, yet it
still remains to flush out the doctrinal contours of the investment capture
model in order to guide the judicial determination regarding which state
benefits may be reserved exclusively for residents and which may not be.
Obviously, the centerpiece of the model is that state citizens have a
legitimate, superior claim of entitlement to those state goods and services
that have been created with taxpayer funds. This formulation itself, however,
suggests several limitations on the scope of the states' authority to prefer
residents in the distribution of state-created goods and services.
First, a state may reserve to its citizens only those state goods and
services whose creation its citizens have funded. If a particular state good or
service was not created by the state or if its creation was funded in
substantial part by specific fees or taxes paid by non-residents, the state
citizens have no particular claim of entitlement superior to that of non-
residents. 149
Second, even with respect to those goods and services funded by state
taxpayers, state citizens only have a claim of entitlement to the good or
service; they do not have a corresponding right to discriminate against non-
residents as such.' 50 Rather, the right to deny non-residents access to the
good or service derives from and is contingent upon the need for such
discriminatory treatment in order to vindicate the citizens' claim of
entitlement. Stated differently, state citizens do not have the right to insist
that non-residents be denied access to the good or service if their own access
to and enjoyment of the good or service would not be hampered thereby.
This limitation on the investment capture defense's scope focuses
attention on whether the good or service is exhaustible-whether a non-
resident's use or consumption of the good or service thereby displaces a
resident's ability to use or consume the good or service. For exhaustible
goods, such as places at a public university with limited enrollment, the state
148 Varat, supra note 9, at 529-30.
149 See GSW, Inc. v. Long County, 999 F.2d 1508, 1513 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting
that the market participant exception did not apply because the county had not invested
any public funds in the privately-owned waste landfill).
150 Cf Varat, supra note 9, at 531 (contending that "gratuitous" denial of access to
non-residents would violate minimum rationality required by the Equal Protection
Clause).
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may ban non-residents from enrolling so as to ensure maximum opportunity
for residents. For inexhaustible goods or services, such as police or fire
protection or access to state parks or roads, however, discriminatory
exclusion of non-residents is not justified under the investment capture
model. The discriminatory denial of access for non-residents is not necessary
to vindicate the state's interest in satisfying the legitimate claim of
entitlement to such goods or services held by residents.
Lastly, with respect to both exhaustible and inexhaustible goods and
services, the state may impose a system of discriminatory user fees-that is,
it may charge non-residents more for use of the good or service than it
charges residents.'51 Recall that residents are entitled to preferential access to
goods and services because they have funded them, at least in part, through
their taxes. Even if non-residents may not be or are not excluded from access
to the state-provided good or service, they do not have a claim of entitlement
to such goods or services free of charge. Rather, non-residents can be made
to pay their way, and, to the extent that the state's taxpayers have subsidized
the production of the good or service through their taxes, non-residents may
be charged more than residents (who, so the theory goes, have already
contributed towards the good or service) for their use of the good or service.
Of course, such discriminatory user fees must bear a reasonable relationship
to the actual cost of providing the good or service to the non-residents-non-
residents cannot be made to subsidize the production of the good or service
for residents' benefit. 152 In such a case, the excess amount paid would be
akin to an impermissible tax levied exclusively upon non-residents.
In sum, a court committed to the investment capture model must focus
on the relationship between the challenged state program and the state's
legitimate interest in returning to its citizens the benefit of their taxes.
Specifically, it would ask whether the state's citizens have funded the
specific good or service and, if so, whether the discriminatory treatment
accorded non-residents is necessary to vindicate the citizens' claim of
entitlement to the item. This latter inquiry will itself require the court to
assess whether the good or service is inexhaustible. For exhaustible goods
and services, the state may legitimately exclude non-residents from any
access to the good or service or charge non-residents higher fees for such
good or service. For inexhaustible goods and services, discriminatory
exclusion is impermissible, though discriminatory user fees are acceptable.
Moreover, if the state imposes a system of discriminatory user fees (either
with respect to exhaustible or inexhaustible goods and services), the court
151 Cf Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 399 (1948) (noting that a state may charge
more for license fees even if it may not exclude non-residents entirely).
1521d. at 395, 406-07 (holding license fee 100 times that for residents was
unreasonable).
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must ask whether the price charged non-residents reasonably corresponds to
the actual cost of providing such good or service to the non-residents.
IV. APPLYING THE INVESTMENT CAPTURE MODEL
The investment capture defense, properly understood, requires courts to
engage in a sensitive evaluation of the origins and nature of the specific good
or service to determine whether state citizens have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to the item that would be undermined by non-discriminatory
access by residents and non-residents alike. Obviously, performing that fact-
sensitive analysis will lead to different conclusions with respect to different
types of state actions. To see how, the following sections apply this
framework to some of the more common types of state programs that are
typically reserved for state citizens.
A. Subsidies
Under the investment capture model, cash or in-kind subsidies to in-state
businesses are generally permissible. The prototypical subsidy is a cash
subsidy paid out of the state's general treasury by order of the legislature
made via the ordinary appropriation process. Because such general treasury
moneys are raised predominantly from state residents, they have a legitimate
claim of entitlement to them. 153 Moreover, because such moneys are
obviously limited-there are many competing demands on the state fisc-
discriminatory treatment is permissible. Indeed, demanding states to provide
subsidies on a non-discriminatory basis would undoubtedly deter states from
providing any subsidies or, at the very least, reduce the amount received by
in-state businesses.
Not all subsidies are permissible, however. When the subsidy is closely
tied to a tax on the out-of-state competitors of the subsidized residents, the
investment capture model provides no defense. In that case, the subsidy is
not being funded by state residents but by out-of-state businesses. An
example of such an unconstitutional subsidy is the Massachusetts tax-and-
subsidy scheme invalidated in West Lynn Creamery. There, Massachusetts
laid a tax on all milk sold by Massachusetts milk dealers. The proceeds of the
tax were deposited in a segregated fund, which was then entirely and
automatically by law distributed to Massachusetts dairy farmers.154 Because
153 Coenen, supra note 9, at 474; Coenen, supra note 10, at 1032, 1037; Levmore,
supra note 9, at 577; Varat, supra note 9, at 541. Indeed, of the commentators who
endorse the market participant doctrine, only Professor Regan rejects the legitimacy of
subsidies. See Regan, supra note 8, at 1196 (rejecting subsidies because their cost to
taxpayers may not be sufficiently high).
154 W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1994).
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the revenue generated by the tax was converted automatically into a subsidy
for in-state dairy farmers, in-state farmers effectively received the tax paid on
their milk plus their pro rata share of the proceeds of the tax levied on out-of-
state milk. 155 For that reason, the Court was right to view the tax-and-subsidy
scheme as a clever way to impose a tax that was felt only by out-of-state
dairy farmers. 156 In short, Massachusetts had developed a system to have
out-of-state interests fund a subsidy for their in-state competitors.
Although Justice Scalia in his concurrence in West Lynn Creamery
focused on the state's use of a segregated fund as the essential,
unconstitutional feature of the program, 157 that feature was ancillary to the
real flaw in the scheme. The critical problem with the Massachusetts tax-and-
subsidy program was not the use of a segregated fund but the fact that the tax
proceeds were, by law, automatically transferred to the in-state dairy farmers.
Even if the tax proceeds had been deposited in the general treasury, the
automatic subsidy feature would still leave out-of-state dairy farmers
subsidizing in-state farmers. Only if the automatic transfer were eliminated
might a dairy tax and a subsequent, independent subsidy to in-state farmers
pass constitutional muster.
Interestingly, the State of Maine responded to West Lynn Creamery in
precisely that way. After the Court of Appeals invalidated Maine's virtually
identical tax-and-subsidy scheme on the basis of West Lynn Creamery,158 the
state legislature reenacted the milk tax, with the proceeds now being
deposited into the general fund.' 59 Several months later, the legislature then
enacted a series of appropriation bills that provided a subsidy out of the
general fund to in-state dairy farmers.160
155 Because of this feature of the tax-and-subsidy scheme, it was not essential (as
was in fact the case) that most of the milk sold in Massachusetts came from out of state.
Id. at 188 (noting that 2/3 of milk sold in Massachusetts was from out of state). The state
of Maine had a virtually identical tax-and-subsidy system to support its dairy farmers, but
most of the milk in Maine was produced in state. Nevertheless, because most of the
Maine dairy tax was automatically converted into a subsidy for in-state dairy farmers,
they too received both the tax paid on their milk plus their share of the taxes paid on out-
of-state milk. See Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. LaFaver, 33 F.3d 1, 1-2 (1st Cir. 1994)
(invalidating Maine's tax-and-subsidy as indistinguishable from Massachusetts's).
156 W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 194.
157 Id. at 210-11 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Coenen, supra
note 10, at 1040-42 (criticizing Scalia's reliance on distinction between segregated fund
and general treasury).
158 Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. LaFaver, 33 F.3d 1, 1-2 (1st Cir. 1994).
159 An Act to Continue the Fee on the Handling of Milk, ch. 2, § 1-5, 1995 Me.
Laws 1, 1-4 (codified at ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 4771-4773 (repealed 1998)).
160 Supplemental Appropriations from General Fund, ch. 5, § A-1, 1995 Me. Laws
8, 9; Supplemental Appropriations from General Fund, ch. 368, § B-i, 1995 Me. Laws
486, 488; Appropriations, ch. 665, § KK-1, 1995 Me. Laws 1826, 1826.
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Maine may have been too clever, however. Although the Court of
Appeals did not pass on the merits of the revamped Maine tax-and-subsidy-
it dismissed the ensuing federal court challenge on jurisdictional
groundsl 6 I-Maine's separation of the tax and subsidy into separate pieces
of legislation does not per se render the scheme constitutional (as the district
court held). 162 If the legislature were appropriating approximately the same
amount in subsidies as collected via the milk tax, the fact that there was no
automatic conversion feature in the statute creating the tax would not matter.
In that case, the legislature itself would simply be performing the automatic
conversion itself. Whether that in fact was what was going on should have
been apparent from the legislative debates and fiscal accounts. Moreover,
even if there was some disparity in the amount collected and amount
appropriated in a given year, a pattern of close approximation year-by-year
would likewise testify to a de facto automatic conversion system. Only if the
subsidy payments varied significantly from the proceeds of the tax would the
Maine system differ in substance from the Massachusetts scheme invalidated
in West Lynn Creamery. In that case, mixing the milk tax proceeds with all
the other state revenues, together with the use of annual legislative
appropriations, the amount of which bore no necessary relationship to the
amount of revenue collected via the milk tax, would break the link between
the milk tax and the subsidy such that the subsidy would be consistent with
the investment capture model.
B. Tax Exemptions and Credits
In contrast to subsidies, tax exemptions or credits reserved for in-state
goods or businesses are almost always impermissible.1 63 This may be
shocking to some, who will rightly point out that a $5 cash subsidy and a $5
161 Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Maine, 116 F.3d 943, 947 (1st Cir. 1997).
162 Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Mahany, 943 F. Supp. 83, 87 (D. Me. 1996); see also
Coenen, supra note 10, at 1050-51 (arguing that separation of tax and subsidy
distinguished Cumberland Farms from W. Lynn Creamery). Curiously, Professor Coenen
argues that nevertheless, as a matter of constitutional remediation, the Maine subsidy is
unconstitutional because it was enacted in response to W Lynn Creamery. Id. at 1052.
The mere fact that a state has responded to a controlling Supreme Court decision to
reform its laws, however, hardly demonstrates that the new law is unconstitutional.
Perhaps Maine's subsidy is still linked as a practical matter to the milk tax, but the
temporal proximity of the new legislation to the Supreme Court's decision in W. Lynn
Creamery does not bear upon that issue in the least.
163 The one exception being for so-called compensatory taxes. To date, the Court
has applied the compensatory tax doctrine only to sales and use taxes, but it is
conceivable that a narrowly crafted tax exemption for some in-state activity could be
defended on the ground that it compensates for some other tax levied exclusively on the
same activity.
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tax credit are economically equivalent. 164 While that is undoubtedly true, it is
also undoubtedly beside the point: tax credits for in-state businesses are also
economically equivalent to tariffs on out-of-state businesses, which are
universally agreed to be unconstitutional. 165 Economic equivalence, in other
words, provides no basis for distinguishing among subsidies, tax exemptions,
and tariffs. 166
Nor can the prohibition on discriminatory tax exemptions and credits be
justified, as Professor Coenen and others do, on the functional ground that
discriminatory subsidies are more difficult for legislatures to enact than
discriminatory tax exemptions and credits. 167 This view, which draws upon
the public choice literature, contends that subsidies are more politically
transparent because they are easily detected, of known amount, and must be
reauthorized by the legislature every year, which legislators may be reluctant
to do. 168 Tax exemptions and credits, in contrast, can be buried amidst
complex tax provisions, are of unknown cost, and, once authorized, are
permanent.169 Of course, this overstates the difference between subsidies and
exemptions-some subsidies can be effectively concealed from public sight
and accountability,] 70 while some tax exemptions, particularly those listed in
official tax expenditure budgets, are of known cost and readily transparent.
More importantly, though, the mere fact that discriminatory subsidies may be
more difficult to enact does not explain why discriminatory tax exemptions
and credits, unlike their economically equivalent subsidies, should be
prohibited.
164 Coenen, supra note 9, at 479.
165 W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (1994).
166 There is, admittedly, one respect in which a subsidy differs from a tax
exemption. The subsidy recipient may not reinvest it in its business operations (thereby
allowing it to undersell its out-of-state competitors) but rather may simply pocket the
money (e.g., put it in a Swiss bank account). In such a case, there would be no impact on
its competitive position vis-A-vis out-of-state businesses, and out-of-state businesses
would feel no burden. Cf W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 215 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(defending Massachusetts subsidy on this basis). That discriminatory tax exemptions and
credits always harm out-of-state businesses, while discriminatory subsidies only do so
when the money is reinvested, seems too slender a reed to base a constitutional rule
against the former, however, particularly given the legislative intent and likelihood that
the subsidy will be reinvested. Coenen, supra note 10, at 1019.
167 Coenen, supra note 9, at 480-81; Coenen, supra note 10, at 983-97; see also
Enrich, supra note 13, at 395, 442-43; Regan, supra note 8, at 1194 (noting that cost of
subsidies may inhibit their passage).
168 Coenen, supra note 9, at 480-81; Coenen, supra note 10, at 985-94.
169 Coenen, supra note 10, at 98 5-94.
170 See Zelinsky, supra note 95, at 406-08 (noting that entitlement-based
expenditure programs mirror tax exemptions in this respect).
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The critical difference between subsidies, on the one hand, and tax
exemptions and tariffs, on the other hand, is neither economic nor political
but structural. Unlike subsidies, which involves the payment of actual dollars
previously owned by state taxpayers and contributed to the state in the form
of taxes, tax exemptions or credits do not involve the transfer of dollars
previously owned by taxpayers. Rather, in "granting" a tax exemption or
credit, the state has merely announced that it will not take dollars from the
benefited business that it would otherwise have to pay in taxes absent the
exemption or credit. Money never changes hands. This distinction is crucial
because what the state has "given" the benefited business is not taxpayer
money but a statutory right for the business to keep its own cash., 7 1
This difference has constitutional salience for two reasons, one
normative and one analogical. As a normative matter, the investment capture
model only authorizes discrimination with regard to the distribution of state
assets, such as tax dollars or state property, that the state citizens have
created. It is the fact that the citizens paid taxes to the state that gives them a
legitimate claim of entitlement that the state use those tax dollars, which used
to be theirs, to subsidize selected state residents. In contrast, state citizens
have no claim of entitlement that the state use its taxation power in a manner
that favors in-state residents at the expense of their out-of-state competitors.
In providing a discriminatory tax exemption or credit to certain state
residents, the citizens are not giving anything of their creation or previous
ownership to the favored residents. 172 No cash or property is transferred from
the state to the resident. Rather, the sole value received by the benefited
resident-the only way in which it is better off than had the state done
nothing-is the competitive advantage it receives from the imposition of
taxes on its out-of-state competitors. For this reason, discriminatory uses of
the state's taxation power stand on a different footing than discriminatory
uses of its spending power.
Indeed, the Court expressly drew upon this distinction and gave it
dispositive weight in New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach. Recall that,
there, the Court invalidated Ohio's motor fuel sales tax as applied to ethanol
because Ohio had given a tax credit to ethanol made in Ohio but not other
states. Explaining its decision, the Court announced that Ohio's actions did
not fit within the market participant doctrine because they involved the
"computation of taxes-a primeval governmental activity."'1 73 Literally
171 For this reason, I disagree with Professor Coenen that the difference between
subsidies and tax exemptions is merely formal. Coenen, supra note 10, at 980.
172 It is on this basis that the Court has held that a tax exemption for churches does
not violate the Establishment Clause, though a subsidy does. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of
N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970).
173 New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 277 (1988).
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speaking, that did not distinguish tax exemptions from subsidies, which
involve the state's spending power, which is also a "primeval governmental
activity."'1 74 The meaning of that observation became clearer later in the
opinion, however, when the Court expressly contrasted Ohio's
discriminatory tax exemption with Indiana's discriminatory subsidy for its
in-state ethanol industry. 175 As the Court bluntly put it, "[d]irect
subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of [the
Dormant Commerce Clause]; discriminatory taxation of out-of-state
manufacturers does."'1 76
As an analogical matter, this difference also explains how discriminatory
tax exemptions are more akin to tariffs than discriminatory subsidies. Recall
that discriminatory tariffs, tax exemptions, and subsidies are all economically
equivalent. What makes discriminatory tax exemptions and credits different
from discriminatory subsidies is again the fact that the benefited resident
does not receive actual cash from the state via its spending power but rather
only the competitive economic advantage that results from the state's
taxation of its out-of-state competitors. In that respect, however,
discriminatory tax exemptions and credits are identical to tariffs, which
likewise only benefit state residents in that indirect sense.
For this reason, the Court has been right to analogize discriminatory tax
exemptions and credits to tariffs rather than to discriminatory subsidies.
Thus, for example, in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, the Court invalidated
Hawaii's discriminatory tax exemption for certain domestically-produced
intoxicating beverages because the measure operated to raise the relative
costs of out-of-state liquors. 177 And, in Camps Newfound/Owatonna, the
Court invalidated Maine's discriminatory property tax exemption for
charities that served in-state residents, noting expressly that the measure was
"an export tariff that targets out-of-state consumers by taxing the businesses
that principally serve them."' 178
174 Coenen, supra note 10, at 1013.
175 New Energy, 486 U.S. at 278.
176 d.; see also Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S.
564, 590 (1997) (reaffirming distinction between discriminatory subsidies and
discriminatory tax exemptions); Pelican Chapter, Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc.
v. Edwards, 128 F.3d 910, 918-19 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that property tax exemption
does not fit within market participant doctrine because taxation is sovereign, not
proprietary, function); Enrich, supra note 13, at 442.
177 Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 273 (1984).
178 Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 580-81; see also W. Lynn Creamery,
Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1994) (viewing tax-and-subsidy as discriminatory
tax exemption, which is akin to tariff). In Camps Newfound/Owatonna, the Court also
rejected the notion that discriminatory tax exemptions were equivalent to a state purchase
[Vol. 69:469
TAKING CARE OF OURSELVES
Lastly, a word to those who may find the foregoing analysis too formal:
The notion that discriminatory tax exemptions and credits are unfair to
burdened out-of-state interests in a way that discriminatory subsidies are not
may strike some as far fetched, particularly given their economic
equivalence. Yet, the proof is in the pudding: while out-of-state interests
regularly challenge discriminatory tax exemptions and credits, there is no
similar pattern of challenges to discriminatory subsidies.179 In short, the
victims of discriminatory tax exemptions and credits see a difference.
C. State Purchases and Sales
Virtually every state has purchasing preference rules that require
governmental purchasing agents to favor in-state vendors when buying items
for government use. The economic impact of these rules can be significant,
particularly for vendors of goods for which the government is the largest
purchaser.18
As a general rule, such preferential purchasing policies are consistent
with the investment capture model.' 81 The reason for this is clear: in
purchasing goods or services, the state is spending its own money, which is
raised predominantly from state citizens. As such, state citizens have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to be favored by the state when it decides to
purchase items, such as pens or gasoline, for state use. 182 Moreover, because
state purchasing dollars are limited, such discrimination is not gratuitous.
of the exempted item, observing that such a rule would effectively license tariffs and
other discriminatory taxes too. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 594.
179 Perhaps this absence of challenges is due either to a lack of standing or the belief
that any challenge would be futile. The Court's decision in Bacchus Imports alleviates
any concern about the lack of standing, see Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 267 (holding
that change in competitive position is injury sufficient for standing), and the Court's
repeated assertions that the constitutionality of direct subsidies is an open question
addresses the second concern. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 589; W.
Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 199 n.15; New Energy, 486 U.S. at 278. Admittedly, cash
subsidies are less common than tax exemptions, but subsidies do exist. See Coenen, supra
note 10, at 1053.
180 See also Coenen, supra note 9, at 443-44; Linde, supra note 11, at 53-54.
181 See Smith Setzer & Sons, Inc. v. South Carolina Procurement Review Panel, 20
F.3d 1311, 1320 (4th Cir. 1994); J.F. Shea Co., Inc. v. City of Chicago, 992 F.2d 745,
749 (7th Cir. 1993); Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 911-12 (3d
Cir. 1990); cf Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 461 (1992) (suggesting that a state
decision to purchase a certain percentage of in-state coal for a state-owned power plant
would be permissible).
182 Chance Mgmt., Inc. v. South Dakota, 97 F.3d 1107, 1111, 1113 (8th Cir. 1996);
Am. Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719, 725 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Coenen, supra
note 9, at 444; Varat, supra note 9, at 546; see also Big Country Foods, Inc. v. Board of
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Likewise, states may typically decide to whom they wish to sell state-
created goods and services. Because taxpayer funds are used to create the
good or service, the same analysis holds: state citizens have a legitimate
claim of entitlement to preferential access to such goods or services. 183 On
this basis, the Court's decision in Reeves reached the right result, albeit not
for the reasons assigned by the majority. Because South Dakotan taxpayers
had paid for the state-owned cement plant, they had a superior right to its
product. 184
This general rule in favor of allowing discrimination with respect to state
purchasing and asset disposition policies, however, is not absolute. There are
two special circumstances that warrant particular attention: (1) when the state
has a monopoly or monopsony on the good or service, and (2) when the state
is attempting to use its leverage to control its trading partners' conduct with
respect to other private entities (the issue of so-called "downstream
restraints").
1. State Monopoly and Monopsony
The prototypical case for applying the market participant exception
involves instances in which the state is just one of many buyers or sellers of
the particular good or service. In such cases, the state's discriminatory policy
is typically viewed with less alarm because the excluded non-resident buyers
and sellers can find other individuals with whom to deal. Thus, for example,
in upholding Virginia's policy of selling only Virginia-made wines in state-
owned liquor stores, the Court of Appeals emphasized that there were more
than 10,000 other, private wine retailers in the state to whom customers
could turn to purchase their favorite California Cabernet or French
Burgundy.18 5
Educ., 952 F.2d 1173, 1180 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding market participant doctrine as
applied to discriminatory milk purchasing policy funded in part with federal funds).
183 Coenen, supra note 9, at 445-46; Varat, supra note 9, at 549; see also Brooks v.
Vassar, 462 F.3d 341, 360 (4th Cir. 2006) (upholding Virginia policy of stocking only
Virginia-made wines at state-owned liquor stores); Swin Res. Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming
County, 883 F.2d 245, 249-50 (3d Cir. 1989) (upholding county policy to charge more
for disposal of out-of-state waste at county-owned landfill).
184 See also Chance Mgmt. v. South Dakota, 97 F.3d 1107, 1111, 1113 (8th Cir.
1996) (upholding South Dakota's refusal to sell video gaming licenses to non-residents
because state had invested taxpayer money in developing technology used in the
machines).
185 Brooks, 462 F.3d at 357; see also Big Country, 952 F.2d at 1181 (upholding
market participant doctrine as applied to state milk purchasing policy because state did
not have monopsony on purchases of milk); Am. Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp.
719, 720 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (noting that printing company excluded from state business
still supplied private printing needs).
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The equities of the situation look different, however, if the state is the
lone seller or purchaser of the particular good or service. In such instances,
the state's status as a monopolist seller or monopsonist purchaser can leave
excluded non-residents with no alternative customers, at least within that
particular state. 186 The critical question is whether these considerations alter
the analysis and justify prohibiting states from favoring residents when they
act as a monopolist or monopsonist.
In my view, the central consideration is whether the state's monopoly
status is either the product of state law (a monopoly by law) or is the result of
prohibitively high entry barriers (natural monopoly). The fact that private
competitors cannot emerge either because of state law or the existence of a
natural monopoly removes the state's otherwise proprietary actions from the
scope of the investment capture defense. With regard to monopolies by law,
the fact that the state has banned private competition transforms the character
of the state's actions.1 87 The state is no longer simply returning taxpayer
created goods or services to the residents who funded their creation; it is also
denying non-residents access to the goods or services through its monopoly
status. Such monopolistic exclusion is necessary neither to promote political
fairness nor to prevent non-resident free riders.
For this reason, in my view, the Court of Appeals reached the wrong
result in Chance Management, Inc. v. South Dakota.18 8 There, South Dakota
created a state video gaming enterprise and expressly forbade private gaming
companies from entering the market, thereby giving the state a legal
monopoly in the provision of video gaming services. 189 After investing
several million taxpayer dollars in creating some of the technology to be used
in the gaming consoles, 190 South Dakota then adopted the policy that it
would not license companies to provide video gaming services unless they
were owned by residents. 191 Repeatedly emphasizing that the state had
invested taxpayer dollars in creating the video gaming enterprise, a divided
186 Of course, there will often be dispute as to whether the state possesses a
monopoly. Compare Brooks, 462 F.3d at 357 (stating that state competed with numerous
retailers in wine market) with id. at 363 (Goodwin, J., concurring and dissenting) (stating
that state had monopoly on wine sales at liquor stores).
187 See Brooks, 462 F.3d at 363 (Goodwin, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing
that, because the state had a legal monopoly on liquor stores, its discriminatory policy of
stocking only Virginia-made wines fell outside the market participant exception).
188 97 F.3d 1107 (8th Cir. 1996).
189 Id. at 1109 (discussing S.D. CONST. art. III, § 25, which bans all lotteries except
the lottery owned and operated by the state).
19 0 Id.
191 S.D. CODIFtED LAWS § 42-7A-43 (2004). Individual operators had to be
residents, while corporate operators had to be majority owned by residents. Id.
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panel of the court upheld the South Dakota policy as within the market
participant exception.192
The fact that South Dakota had a monopoly over video gaming services
in the state-that private gaming companies could not enter the market to
compete with the state-proved to be the central issue dividing the panel. For
the majority, the state's monopolistic status was simply immaterial. As the
majority conclusorily put it, the fact that the state "is the dominant actor in
the market does not mean it is not a participant."'193 For Judge Lay, who
dissented, the fact that South Dakota possessed a legal monopoly rendered
the state's actions more akin to regulation of the market, than mere
participation in it. 194 As Judge Lay correctly noted, the state was not merely
deciding with whom to deal, it was also excluding non-residents from the
video gaming industry in the state by prohibiting private video gaming
services to open-a classic regulatory action.195
Natural monopolies pose a closer question, but the result is the same in
my view. Because, by hypothesis, it possesses a natural monopoly, the state
need not fear any free rider problems-the fact that private competitors
cannot emerge because of the prohibitively high entry costs means that the
state can charge all users of its good or service whatever price necessary to
recoup its costs. For that reason, any discriminatory exclusion of non-
residents would be gratuitous and therefore outside the scope of the
investment capture defense. Thus, although the state has not created the
monopoly, it has availed itself of the benefits of the natural monopoly, and,
in so doing, it has in a sense assumed the obligation to deal with all potential
customers on a non-discriminatory basis. 196
192 Chance Mgmt., 97 F.3d at 1111.
193 Id. The majority subsequently noted that the excluded non-residents could deal
with other private gaming businesses in South Dakota, such as horse and dog racing. Id.
at 1114. That observation was entirely beside the point, however. The majority itself, in
another part of the opinion, had noted that the relevant market in which the state was
participating was limited to video lottery services, not all forms of gambling. Id. at 1112.
Thus, the state had excluded non-residents entirely from the particular market at issue. In
short, the fact that the company could enter the dog racing business no more justified its
exclusion from the video lottery business than the fact that the company could still enter
the food-and-beverage or hedge fund business in South Dakota.
194 Id. at 1119 (Lay, J., dissenting).
195 Id.
196 Varat, supra note 9, at 536 (noting similar requirements are imposed on private
businesses by virtue of antitrust and common law). The best example would be a public
utility, such as an electric company. It is inconceivable that a state could deny electrical
service to vacation homes owned and used periodically by non-residents. Cf Coenen,
supra note 9, at 485 (discussing similar hypothetical for non-resident corporations). Even
if taxpayer dollars have subsidized the construction of the utility, the state can vindicate
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Support for this view comes from Western Oil and Gas Association v.
Cory.197 There, petroleum refiners brought a Dormant Commerce Clause
challenge to the State of California's imposition of a new rental fee upon
petroleum refiners for their pipelines that crossed the State's submerged
lands. The Court of Appeals rejected the State's defense that the market
participant doctrine applied because it was merely acting in a proprietary
capacity as the lessor of state-owned submerged lands.198 Elaborating, the
court emphasized the State's monopoly status:
The permanency of [the refiners'] facilities does not permit them to
"shop around". There is no other competitor to which they can go for the
rental of the required strip of California coastline. The Commission has a
complete monopoly over the sites used by the oil companies. The
companies have no choice but to renew their leases despite the volumetric
rate, as the oil, gas and petroleum-derived products cannot be transported to
plaintiffs' facilities without traversing the state-owned lands. 1 99
In short, there was simply no other way for the oil companies to transport
their product except through pipelines over the State lands. Thus, the court
was right to apply the Dormant Commerce Clause to the State's attempt to
capitalize on its natural monopoly.200
Absent these two types of monopolies, however, the fact that the state
has a monopolisitic or monopsonistic position should not detract from its
ability to choose with whom it wishes to deal. In such cases, the state's
monopoly power is a mere fortuity arising from the fact that private
competitors have not emerged. That they can and might still emerge is reason
enough to allow the state to choose with whom it wishes to deal. 20 1 Thus, for
its interest in returning value to its taxpayers/electric customers by charging the non-
residents more for the electricity; there is no need to exclude non-residents entirely.
197 726 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1984).
198 Id. at 1343.
199 Id.
200 The court invalidated the challenged rental fee as an impermissible burden on
interstate commerce. Id. at 1345. It would seem to follow afortiori that a discriminatory
policy-i.e., had California refused to rent its submerged lands except to California
companies-would likewise have been invalid. Cf Shell Oil Co. v. City of Santa Monica,
830 F.2d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 1987) (declaring discriminatory access to lands over which
state has monopoly would offend Dormant Commerce Clause).
201 In this respect, my approach differs from that of Professors Varat and Coenen,
who both urge a more flexible, holistic, all-factors-considered approach. Varat, supra
note 9, at 540; Coenen, supra note 9, at 484-85. Professor Varat, in particular, would
focus on the importance of the good or service and its availability in other states,
including the non-resident's home state. Varat, supra note 9, at 533, 537, 539 & n.191.
Such an approach would undoubtedly be appropriate for Congress to use in deciding
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example, the Court was right in Reeves to hold that South Dakota could
reserve its cement from its state-owned plant exclusively for state residents,
despite the fact that the plant was the only one in the state. As the Court
observed, there was no legal or practical barrier to the establishment of
additional cement plants in the state.202 Consequently, the state's monopoly
position was purely the result of private choices made by other cement
manufacturers not to enter the South Dakota market' 203 That they could do so
at any time served as a powerful incentive for the state to limit its
discriminatory actions and thereby minimized the concern that the state's
discriminatory policy would last longer than necessary.204
2. Downstream Restraints
Once again, the prototypical case for application of the investment
capture defense is when the state is agreeing to trade only with in-state
vendors or buyers. 205 In such cases, the state's discriminatory action is
clearly tied to ensuring that the state's tax dollars remain in the state, at least
initially.
The situation changes, however, if the state is focusing not on who it
deals with but rather who its trading partners in turn do business with. This is
the problem of "downstream restraints"--the state is attempting to use its
purchasing power to control the behavior of its trading partners by
conditioning its willingness to trade with them on their agreement to favor
residents. 20 6
when state discriminatory purchasing and sales policies should be outlawed, but, in
deciding what the Constitution prohibits, such ad hoc inquiries threaten to destabilize the
principled adjudication of cases and leave both states and private parties uncertain as to
their legal rights and responsibilities.
202 Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 444 (1980) ("Nor has it restricted the ability
of private firms or sister States to set up plants within its borders.").
203 Indeed, South Dakota's monopoly status arose only by virtue of the fact that the
private cement plant closed as part of an effort to drive up regional prices in cement. See
id. at 431 n.1.
204 In fact, South Dakota eliminated the discriminatory policy once economic
conditions changed. Id. at 434 n.5. That should hardly be surprising; it had every reason
not to discriminate when supply outstripped domestic demand so as to increase its own
revenues and to prevent the development of other cement plants, which might compete
with the state with respect to both in-state and out-of-state buyers.
205 See, e.g., Reeves, 447 U.S. at 442; Am. Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp.
719, 725 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (upholding state statute requiring all printing services
purchased by state be done in state).
206 Downstream restraints can also arise in the context of tax exemptions. See, e.g.,
Pelican Chapter, Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Edwards, 128 F.3d 910, 919
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The constitutionality of downstream restraints is a complex question, and
the categorical answers provided by the Court and some commentators elide
important distinctions. 20 7 In my view, the key factor to consider is whether
the downstream restraint is linked to the state's legitimate interest in
channeling state funds and resources to state residents. If so, the restraint
falls within the investment capture defense; if not, the restraint falls outside
that defense. Applying this criteria, some, but not all, downstream restraints
are constitutional. Moreover, the analysis, though conceptually the same,
differs somewhat in detail depending on whether the state is tying the
downstream restraint to a purchase of some good or service from a private
vendor versus a sale of some state-created good or service to a private
purchaser.
a. State as Purchaser
An example of a perfectly permissible downstream restraint is that at
issue in White. Recall that, there, the City of Boston required all contractors
on city-funded public works to ensure that 50% of their workers were
residents of Boston.20 8 By its terms, the city order applied to all projects in
which any city funds were expended, but the Court expressly limited its
consideration of the issue to those public works that were funded entirely by
the city.20 9 It was on this basis that the Court was able to conclude that the
benefited residents were, "in a substantial if informal sense, working for the
city."' 210 Indeed, the Court again emphasized that feature in upholding the
order, declaring that "[i]nsofar as the city expended only its own funds in
entering into construction contracts for public projects, it was a market
participant and entitled to be treated as such. '211
Although the Court did not justify its decision upholding Boston's
discriminatory hiring policy in these terms, it is easy to see how its policy fits
(5th Cir. 1997) (invalidating a property tax exemption that was conditioned on taxpayer's
agreement to ensure that in-state products and labor were used).
207 See Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 97 (holding that a state may not impose conditions on
activities outside markets in which it participates); Coenen, supra note 9, at 473 (arguing
for a general rule prohibiting downstream restraints); Varat, supra note 9, at 564 (arguing
for a general rule prohibiting downstream restraints in context of disposition of state
resources).
208 White, 460 U.S. at 205-06 & n.1.
209 Id. at 209. The Court also considered the propriety of the order as applied to
public works funded with federal tax dollars, and, with respect to these construction
projects, the Court held that Congress had affirmatively authorized such discriminatory
policies with respect to federally-funded public works. Id. at 213.
2 10 Id. at 211 n.7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
211 Id. at 214-15.
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within the investment capture defense. Because only city funds were at stake,
it was legitimate for the city to demand that the contractors prefer city
residents in working on the city-funded projects. The purpose of the restraint
was to ensure that tax dollars (and only those dollars) remained in the local
economy. 212
As the Supreme Court recognized in White, however, the validity of
downstream restraints becomes more clouded if the government is attempting
to control its trading partner's behavior with respect to activities that are not
funded exclusively by the government. In such cases, the constitutionality of
the downstream restraint properly turns on a fact-intensive investigation that
compares the extent of the public funding and the cost of the demanded
preference. Let's change the facts from White so that Boston is providing
only a portion of the costs of construction. If Boston contributed $50 million
to a $100 million construction project, but employing the designated number
of Boston residents would cost $40 million, the restraint would still be
constitutional as applied to this hypothetical project. As in White itself, it is
still fair to say that the benefited residents work for the city; in essence, the
city contribution is akin to a subsidy to the contractor in return for the
contractor's promise to use the funds to hire city residents. In such case, the
restraint is ensuring that city tax dollars (and only those dollars) remain in the
city to the best extent possible.
Now suppose that Boston contributed only $25 million to the
construction project, but employing the mandated number of Boston
residents still cost $40 million. In this case, the condition would be
unconstitutional. The city-provided funds do not cover the expense of
employing the city residents, so it is no longer fair to view the benefited
212 See also Am. Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719, 725 (M.D. Fla. 1972)
(upholding state statute requiring all state printing to be done in state); Allen v. Labsap,
87 S.W. 926, 928 (Mo. 1905) (upholding an ordinance requiring all stone to be used in
public works to be finished in state). But see Treat v. Coler, 59 N.E. 776, 778 (N.Y.
1901) (invaliding similar New York statute). In Treat, Chief Justice Parker dissented
precisely on the ground, not discussed by the majority, that the state was not subject to
the Dormant Commerce Clause when it was deciding how taxpayer funds were spent on
public works. Id. at 779 (Parker, C.J., dissenting). Moreover, not to gild the lily, the U.S.
Supreme Court expressly discredited Treat. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 437 n.9.
Professor Coenen distinguishes the stone firisher cases from White on the ground
that, because stone finishers "often are both physically and temporally removed from the
construction project," they do not work for the city like the benefited construction
workers in White. See Coenen, supra note 9, at 471. Not only does that distinction
embroil courts in the difficult task of deciding what type of workers can be said to work
for the city (day laborers, yes; stone finishers, no), it is entirely immaterial to the central
question whether the restraint is related and limited to the state's or city's investment. If,
for example, the government has entirely funded the public works, it may insist that all
work on the project, no matter of what nature, be done in state.
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workers as employed by the city. Rather, the city is requiring the contractors
to use funds obtained elsewhere (not from the city itself) to employ city
residents. And, because the city has no legitimate interest in demanding that
the contractors spend their own funds to favor city residents, the restraint in
this case would be unconstitutional. 213
Perhaps the clearest example of an unconstitutional downstream restraint
is where the restraint is entirely unrelated to any state expenditure or
investment of state resource. In such case, the state is not recouping the
benefits of any state funds but is trying to mask its regulatory actions in
contractual garb. Thus, for example, the Court of Appeals was right to
condemn the discriminatory waste disposal policy at issue in GSW, Inc. v.
Long County.2 14 There, the county government in Alabama entered into a
contract with a private, Georgia-based company to build a landfill within the
county. 215 After the contract was signed, the county government demanded
that the company not accept waste from beyond 150 miles, and, when the
company refused to accept that limitation, the county rescinded its
contract.21
6
Invalidating the county's actions, the Court of Appeals correctly noted
that no tax dollars were at stake-that the county was not a partner of the
private company in developing the landfill.217 The county's "contribution" to
the landfill was limited to the issuance of a license to the company and some
213 See also Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 530 (1978) (invalidating state law that
required lessees of state property to hire residents because the statute "extends to
employers who have no connection whatsoever with the State's oil and gas, perform no
work on state land, have no contractual relationship with the State, and receive no
payment from the State"); Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 63 (1st
Cir. 1999) (rejecting market participant doctrine as applied to state law requiring
companies doing business with the state to divest from Burma because the law "appl[ies]
to activities not even remotely connected to such companies' interactions with
Massachusetts"). For the same reason, the New Jersey Supreme Court was right
(although not for the reason it relied upon) that the market participant doctrine did not
shield a New Jersey statute that required all suppliers of milk to state agencies to certify
that they had purchased as much New Jersey milk in both the preceding year and in the
contract year as would be sold to the state. See Garden State Dairies, Inc. v. Sills, 217
A.2d 126, 130 (N.J. 1966). As Professor Coenen rightly points out, the statute required
the milk vendors to purchase from in-state sources double the amount of milk actually
sold to the state, thereby effectively requiring the vendors to subsidize the New Jersey
dairy industry by purchasing New Jersey milk for sale to other private buyers. Coenen,
supra note 9, at 472.
214 999 F.2d 1508, 1517-18 (11th Cir. 1993).
215 See GSW, Inc. v. Long County, No. CIV. A. CV292-54, 1992 WL 535401, at
1-2 (S.D. Ga. June 29, 1992).
216 GSW, Inc., 999 F.2d at 1510.
217 Id. at 1513. The court noted that, had the county invested its own funds in
developing the landfill, it could conceivably claim to be a market participant. Id. & n.5.
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assistance with state regulators. In essence, the county was conditioning the
issuance of regulatory approval for the landfill upon its agreement not to
accept certain waste. As such, the county's insistence that the private
company refuse to accept waste from other generators outside the 150-mile
limit was, as the court correctly held, an attempt "to gain benefits for its
constituents without providing any funding for the program, rendering the
policy more regulatory than participatory. ''218
b. State as Seller
Lastly, there is the issue of the validity of downstream restraints in the
context of state dispositions of state-owned resources. The Court addressed
this issue in Wunnicke. Recall that, there, the Court invalidated Alaska's
requirement that purchasers of state-owned timber have the logs processed
in-state by private timber processing companies. 219 As the Court ruled,
Alaska could not claim the protection of the market participant doctrine
because Alaska was not a participant in the timber processing market-it was
instead attempting to leverage its control over the sale of state-owned timber
to affect the behavior of purchasers in the downstream, timber-processing
market.
From the perspective of the investment capture defense, the Court's
mind-your-own-market rule makes no sense. A state has a legitimate interest
in ensuring that taxpayer investments accrue to the benefit of state residents.
Thus, to the extent that Alaska had invested in its timber resources-such as
by farming the timber-it had a corresponding right to see that its investment
inured to the benefit of state residents, even if those residents were not the
first purchasers of the timber. The choice as to which residents should benefit
from the state's investment is for the state to make. 220
Instead of drawing the categorical (yet still elusive) rule against
downstream restraints in other markets, the Court should have focused on
whether the restraint was linked to ensuring that taxpayer funds be used for
the benefit of state taxpayers. Although the context differs, the analysis of
downstream restraints attached to state dispositions of state assets
(Wunnicke) does not differ conceptually from that of restraints attached to
state purchases of private goods and services (White). With state purchases,
the inquiry is whether the state's cash payment is sufficiently large to cover
2 1 8 1d
219 South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 97-99 (1984).
220 Alaska could have agreed to sell its timber only to Alaska timber purchasers,
which would clearly be constitutional. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 446-47
(1980). That it chose to use its "investment" for the benefit of timber processors rather
than timber purchasers should present no issue of federal constitutional magnitude.
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the contractor's cost of dealing with the benefited state residents; with state
sales and other dispositions of state assets, the inquiry is whether the terms of
the disposition are such that it can be viewed as an in-kind subsidy to the
purchaser to deal with state residents. Specifically, the court must assess
whether the state has offered an in-kind subsidy to the purchaser, such as by
disposing of the state asset at less than market cost, and whether the extent of
the subsidy is sufficient to cover the purchaser's cost of dealing with the
benefited state residents. If the state has disposed of the state asset at the
prevailing market price, there is no subsidy and, therefore, any downstream
restraint is unconstitutional. 221 Where the state has disposed of the state asset
at less than market price, however, there is at least the possibility that the
downstream restraint is simply a mechanism to ensure that the purchaser in
effect transfers the subsidy to the designated, favored resident.
Where the state has disposed of a state asset at less than market price, the
court must determine whether the difference in price is sufficient to cover the
purchaser's cost of doing business with the specified state residents. This was
the situation confronting the Court in Wunnicke-Alaska had discounted the
price of the timber below the prevailing market price222-but, unfortunately,
the Court made no effort to determine whether the difference in pricing
covered the cost of having the logs processed in Alaska.223 Because of that,
we cannot know for certain whether the downstream restraint was simply an
effort to ensure that purchasers of the timber used their in-kind subsidy for
the benefit of state residents or instead was an attempt to leverage the state's
control over its timber to induce private purchasers to use their own funds to
subsidize the state timber processing industry. If, for example, the timber
discount was $100 per log and the cost of processing each log was $250, the
downstream restraint would be unconstitutional since the in-kind subsidy to
the purchasers (the state's subsidy) would not cover the cost of the
processing (the designated in-state beneficiary of the state's investment).224
221 Cf Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531 (1978) (invalidating downstream
restraint attached to a lease of state property because the measure was "an attempt to
force virtually all businesses that benefit in some way from the economic ripple effect of
Alaska's decision to develop its oil and gas resources to bias their employment practices
in favor of the State's residents").
222 Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 85.
223 Then-Justice Rehnquist viewed the timber sale as an in-kind subsidy. See id. at
103 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Because he made no comparison of the value of the
subsidy and the cost of timber processing, however, it is unclear whether his approach is
consistent with the investment capture model.
224 For this same reason, the Court of Appeals in Pelican Chapter v. Edwards, 128
F.3d 910, 919 (5th Cir. 1997), was right to invalidate Louisiana property tax exemption
that was conditioned on the recipient using only Louisiana goods and workers in
developing the property. Although the court decided the case on the ground that
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If, on the other hand, the discount was $300 per log, the downstream restraint
would be perfectly acceptable; in that case, the restraint would simply ensure
that the non-resident timber purchaser transferred the subsidy to the resident
timber processor.
In short, the state's power to decide with whom it wishes to deal does not
encompass the lesser power to use its market leverage to require the private
parties with whom it does business in turn to agree to deal with state
residents. At the same time, the state does have a legitimate interest in
ensuring that state tax dollars be used for the benefit of state residents. As a
consequence, those downstream restraints that serve merely to channel state
subsidies to state residents via intermediate parties are permissible; those
restraints that go beyond that and attempt to leverage state market power to
require private intermediaries to subsidize state residents are not permissible.
D. Natural Resources
Natural resources present a variant of the previous issue. States often sell
natural resources, and, as such, their distribution of such natural resources
would seem to fall within the rule just discussed for the sale of state-owned
goods and services. The distinguishing feature of natural resources, however,
is the fact that they, unlike other state goods or services, are typically not the
creation of the state or its taxpayers. Rather, the state is often just the
fortuitous beneficiary of its geographic location.225
The notion that there is some constitutional significance to this difference
first arose in Reeves. There, in upholding South Dakota's discriminatory
cement sales policy, the Court expressly contrasted cement with natural
resources, such as coal, timber, wild game, or minerals. 226 Cement, the Court
noted, "is the end product of a complex process whereby a costly physical
plant and human labor act on raw materials." 227 Natural resources, in
contrast, are merely items that "by happenstance" are found in the state.228
To be sure, the Court in Reeves did not expressly endorse a natural resources
exception to the market participant doctrine, nor did it provide a theoretical
justification for treating natural resources differently. Nevertheless, Reeves
discriminatory tax exemptions can never fall within the market participant doctrine, id. at
918-19, the downstream restraint feature would also be unconstitutional because, even if
the tax exemption was equivalent to a subsidy, the value of the tax exemption could not
conceivably cover the full cost of purchasing only Louisiana goods and employing
Louisiana workers.
225 See Swin Res. Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1989).
226 Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 443 (1980).
227 Id. at 444.
228 Id.
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opened the door to consideration of whether non-residents are entitled to
equal access to natural resources.
As one might suspect, the investment capture defense provides a sound
theoretical foundation for a limited natural resources exception. State citizens
have no legitimate claim of entitlement to natural resources whose creation
they have not funded.229 With respect to natural resources that merely happen
to be found in a particular state through no effort of the state itself, such as
minerals and petroleum, non-residents stand in an equal position as residents.
At the same time, however, state citizens do have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to those natural resources that they have expended funds to create
or augment, such as agricultural products grown on state-owned farms. 230
Again, courts must engage in a fact-sensitive inquiry into the state's
relationship to the natural resource to determine whether the resource's
location in the state is merely a windfall or is the product of state
investments.
Petroleum and mineral deposits provide perhaps the clearest example of
a natural resource that is a windfall to the state and that therefore must be
distributed on a non-discriminatory basis.231 The location of oil, gas, and
mineral reserves within particular states owes nothing to the efforts of or
investment by state taxpayers. As such, courts have been right to resist state
efforts to restrict the benefit of such deposits to state residents. Thus, for
example, in Hicklin v. Orbeck,232 the Court invalidated Alaska's requirement
that lessees of state oil and gas reserves employ only residents. Rejecting
Alaska's claim that its ownership of the oil and gas deposits insulated its
statute from review, the Court bluntly declared that "the Commerce Clause
circumscribes a State's ability to prefer its own citizens in the utilization of
natural resources found within its borders, but destined for interstate
commerce."
233
Game and wildlife provide a more difficult situation. The Court has long
since jettisoned the fiction that the state owns all wild animals in its territory
and may therefore reserve them on preferential terms to state residents. In
Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel,234 for example, the Court struck
229 See Swin Res., 883 F.2d at 254 (noting that there is "some place" for a natural
resource exception to market participant doctrine); cf Coenen, supra note 9, at 455
(arguing that sow-and-reap rationale "packs limited force" in context of natural
resources).
230 Varat, supra note 9, at 558.
231 Id. at 557; Coenen, supra note 9, at 460.
232 437 U.S. 518, 534 (1978).
233 Id. at 533; see also West v. Kan. Nat. Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 262 (1911)
(invalidating state law that limited export of privately-owned natural gas to other states);
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 600 (1923) (same).
234 278 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1928).
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down a Louisiana statute that required shrimp to be processed in Louisiana
before being exported to other states. Although the statute declared that
shrimp found in Louisiana waters were the property of the state, the Court
ruled that the state's ownership of the shrimp was not sufficient to justify the
state's discriminatory policy. 235 Likewise, in Hughes v. Oklahoma,236 the
Court invalidated an export embargo on minnows, despite the state's claim
that it owned the minnows in trust for its citizens. 237 Because neither state
had invested state funds in expanding these resources, the Court was right to
view the state efforts as an attempt to reap an unearned windfall.
Matters become more complicated, however, when the state does
undertake efforts to augment the game supply within its borders. The key in
this situation is whether the state has actively augmented the wildlife stocks
or whether it has merely attempted to conserve existing stocks by regulating
the number of game that may be captured or taken. In the former situation,
the investment capture defense provides justification for state favoritism of
state residents because the state's affirmative and costly efforts to increase
the game supply, such as by operating fish hatcheries and restocking lakes
and rivers, provides state citizens with a legitimate claim of entitlement to the
augmented game supply. In the latter situation, however, the state has not
created the wildlife stocks but has merely tried to arrest the decline of the
species. Although conservation efforts are often costly, they do not provide
state citizens with a legitimate claim of entitlement to the wildlife any more
than similar efforts would with respect to oil or gas reserves. 238 The state
citizenry's collective determination to restrict the taking of game does not
ipsofacto give them a claim upon the untaken game.
For this reason, the Court of Appeals, in Conservation Force, Inc. v.
Manning,239 was right to invalidate an Arizona regulation that provided that
no more than 10% of the hunting licenses for elk and certain deer could go to
235 Id. at 13; see also Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 399-402 (1948)
(invalidating discriminatory shrimp licensing fee and rejecting claim that state's
ownership of shrimp insulated fee from challenge under Article IV's Privilege and
Immunities Clause).
236 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
237 Indeed, the Court expressly overruled the contrary holding of Geer v.
Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), that the state could restrict the taking of wild game to
state residents because it owned them in trust for its citizens. See Hughes, 441 U.S. at
335.
238 Cf Gergen, supra note 9, at 1113 (arguing that sharing resources with non-
residents does not increase cost of conservation and thus does not discourage it). But see
LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-10, at 1086 n.14 (3d ed. 2000)
(arguing that conservation efforts do give citizens superior claim to wildlife over non-
residents); Levmore, supra note 9, at 616 (same).
239 301 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2002).
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non-residents. 240 As the Court noted, the stock of elk and deer was the
product of.state conservation efforts, not state breeding farmS.24 1 Rejecting
the notion.,that state conservation efforts give state citizens a claim of
entitlement to the wildlife, the court declared that "[w]here the resource in
question is produced by conservation, rather than being the end product of a
complex process by the state whereby a costly physical plant and human
labor act on raw materials, scarcity of the resources does not itself justify
discrimination against out-of-state residents."242 Consequently, the state had
to demonstrate that its discrimination was justified under the strict scrutiny
applicable to regulatory measures.243
Timber provides perhaps the most difficult case for application of a
natural resources exception. Large timber stands are typically the natural
product of fortuitous geographic location and ample water sources. Where
states merely seek to reap what nature has given them, they have no
legitimate interest in excluding non-residents. 244 Yet some states expend
240 Id. at 989 (referring to ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § 12-4-114 (1991)).
241 Conservation Force, 301 F.3d at 989.
242 Id. at 996 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Curiously, the court
subsequently suggested that some "limited consideration of residency" might be
appropriate if non-residents, because of their number, were effectively excluding
residents from receiving hunting licenses. Id. at 999. The court did not explain the basis
for this reservation. Perhaps the court feared that if residents do not receive some
minimum level of wildlife access, they will not undertake any conservation measures.
That concern, however, could be fully addressed by charging non-residents a sufficiently
high license fee to cover the cost of conservation measures; limiting non-resident access
is therefore more discriminatory than necessary. See Varat, supra note 9, at 560 (noting
availability of less discriminatory means to promote conservation efforts).
243 Conservation Force, 301 F.3d at 995. Subsequently, Congress overruled the
Ninth Circuit and authorized states to discriminate against non-residents with respect to
fish and wildlife. See Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the
Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 6063 (2005); see also
Schutz v. Thorne, 415 F.3d 1128, 1138 (10th Cir. 2005) (upholding Wyoming statute that
imposed quotas and higher fees for non-resident hunting licenses because of passage of
federal law). For a general discussion of Congress's power to overrule the Dormant
Commerce Clause and restore state authority to act in ways inconsistent with that
doctrine, see Norman R. Williams, Why Congress May Not "Overrule" the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 53 UCLA L. REv. 153 (2005).
244 For this reason, the Court's decision in Wunnicke was correctly decided without
regard to the nature of the downstream condition. The Court expressly distinguished
Reeves on the ground that timber was a natural resource and was not like a state-created
good. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 96. That statement could only be true if Alaska was simply
harvesting naturally grown timber rather than replanted trees. And, if Alaska could not
reserve its timber exclusively for non-residents (because state residents have no superior
claim of access to such natural resources), it follows a fortiori that the state could not
demand non-resident purchasers of its timber to favor resident timber processors. Varat,
supra note 9, at 561.
2008]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
considerable resources husbanding and augmenting their forests, such as by
replanting trees after harvesting. In these states, the publicly-owned forests
more closely resemble a tree farm, to which state citizens have a legitimate
claim of entitlement superior to that of non-residents. As always, courts
confronting state regulations governing access to state timber resources
should proceed cautiously and eschew drawing categorical conclusions
applicable to all states-what may hold true for Oregon may not hold true for
Alaska.
Lastly, even as to those natural resources to which the state must provide
non-discriminatory access, it should be noted that the state may still
nonetheless be able to charge non-residents more for such resources. Many
states do invest in their natural resources by making their harvesting and use
possible. Since non-residents do not pay for such state-created services, the
investment capture defense suggests that it is acceptable for states to charge
non-residents more than residents to recoup such taxpayer-funded costs.245
As noted above, however, courts must be duly cautious and ensure that the
difference in pricing reasonably reflects the actual cost of providing non-
residents access to the natural resource.
E. Inexhaustible Goods and Services: Roads, Courts, Etc.
Lastly, there is a final sub-category of state-created goods and services
that cuts across the foregoing types of state favoritism. Despite their creation
by the state, some state goods and services may not be reserved on a
preferential basis for state citizens. Roads are a prime example. Were a state
to prohibit non-residents from using its roads and highways, there would be
little doubt that the Court would invalidate the measure.246 Indeed, in South
245 Professor Varat disagrees, noting that the presence of such natural resources is a
blessing for the state, providing it with a larger tax base and greater economic
opportunities. Varat, supra note 9, at 556. In his view, the natural resource is
compensation enough for the state. While there is some force to this observation-the
free rider problem, for example, is not likely to deter states from investing in mechanisms
to exploit their natural resources given the large windfall that accrues to states from the
sale of such resources-the notion that non-residents can be made to pay their own way
as a matter of basic fairness provides a sufficient justification for such discriminatory
pricing.
2 46 See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass'n v. Whitman, 437 F.3d 313 (3d Cir. 2006)
(invalidating New Jersey ban on interstate but not intrastate trucks using certain New
Jersey highways); Doran v. Mass. Turnpike Auth., 348 F.3d 315, 321 (1st Cir. 2003)
(noting that, after MTA proposed to provide toll discount only to state residents, concerns
about constitutionality of measure prompted MTA to offer discounts to any Fast Lane
users regardless of residency). But cf Endsley v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 276, 284-85
(7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting Dormant Commerce Clause challenge to city's non-
discriminatory operation of a toll road because the city is a market participant).
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Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers,247 the Court
rejected the notion that state ownership of state highways immunized road
regulations from Dormant Commerce Clause challenge.248 Although the
Court upheld the South Carolina regulation, it emphasized that the regulation
was non-discriminatory, thereby suggesting that a different result would have
obtained had South Carolina attempted to reserve its roads only for in-state
trucks. Moreover, since Barnwell, the Court has invalidated several facially
non-discriminatory statutes on Dormant Commerce Clause grounds, further
confirming that state ownership of the roads does not remove them from the
scope of the Dormant Commerce Clause. 249
Likewise, the same holds true for state-owned airports. In Evansville-
Vanderburgh Airport Authority District v. Delta Airlines,250 the Court upheld
a non-discriminatory $1 fee levied on all departing airplane passengers. Like
in Barnwell, the Court emphasized the non-discriminatory nature of the fee,
suggesting that the outcome would have been different had the states levied
the fee only on non-residents or interstate flights. 251
Lower courts and commentators have typically reconciled these
decisions on the ground that roads and other forms of transportation
infrastructure are channels of interstate commerce deserving of special
constitutional protection.252 As one Court of Appeals put it, ensuring non-
discriminatory access to state roads is "essential to an outsider's ability to do
business in the state. '253 While that is no doubt true in a practical sense,
determining what state-provided items are "essential" to private commerce is
no easy task. Roads may be essential to the economy, but what about
universities or landfills? 254 There is no immediately apparent and principled
basis to distinguish among those items, at least in terms of their importance
to the economy.
As a consequence, any inquiry into whether a particular state-provided
good or service is "essential" to interstate commerce runs the risk that every
such good or service, even those that are relatively insignificant, will be
247 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
248 Id. at 189; see also Linde, supra note 11, at 56, 61 (contending that public
ownership is not sufficient justification for discrimination and approving Barnwell).
249 Am. Trucking Ass'n v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987); Raymond Motor Transp.
v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
250 405 U.S. 707 (1972).
251 Id. at 717.
252 Swin Res. Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245, 254 (3d Cir. 1989); Dan
T. Coenen, State User Fees and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 50 VAND. L. REV. 795,
816, 822 (1997); Gergen, supra note 9, at 1132-33.
253 Swin Res., 883 F.2d at 254 (alteration omitted).
254 Cf Buchwald v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Med., 159 F.3d 487, 496 n.9 (10th Cir.
1998).
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deemed to be vital to private commerce. Indeed, this is what happened in
Smith v. Department of Agriculture.255 There, the State of Georgia gave
preferential access to resident farmers in leasing stall space at a state-owned
farmers' market. The state owned and operated the market, and state
taxpayers subsidized its operations because the fees charged farmers for use
of the stalls did not cover the market's expenses. 256 Indeed, as one of the
judges noted, but for Georgia's taxpayers, the market would not exist.257 As
a consequence, this was a classic case for application of the market
participant doctrine. The state was not regulating the purchase or sale of
agricultural produce in the state or even the allocation of stall spaces at
farmers' markets generally; rather, it was simply allocating stall space at a
market owned and operated by the state itself.25 8
The Court of Appeals, however, held that the state's actions were that of
a market regulator, not market participant. The court reasoned that because
the state was not buying or selling the produce but "simply" providing a
suitable marketplace for the purchase and sale of such produce by private
individuals, the state was acting as a market regulator.2 59 Concurring, Judge
Gee elaborated that the market participant exception did not apply because
the state "has focused and localized an existing market by constructing the
physical selling facility in which it is carried on."260 The implication was that
the marketplace was essential to the interstate commerce in farm produce in
the area and that, therefore, the state's favoritism for resident farmers in
allocating stall space was illegitimate.
Smith only involved stall space at a local farmers' market, but its
sweeping rationale-that the state acts as a market regulator whenever it
allocates state-created assets in a way that distorts or inhibits other private
market exchanges-would encompass numerous other, more important
forms of state market actions, such as selective admissions at public
universities and discriminatory solid waste disposal policies at municipally-
owned landfills. Indeed, the court's approach in Smith could potentially
eviscerate the market participant doctrine itself.
In my view, the better way to understand and reconcile decisions such as
Barnwell and Evansville- Vanderburgh is to acknowledge that roads, airports,
parks, judicial systems, and the like are, in a sense, inexhaustible goods.261
255 630 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1980).
256 Id. at 1082 n.1.
257 Id. at 1086 (Gee, J., specially concurring).
258 Id. at 1087 (Randall, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1088.
259 Id. at 1083.
260 Id. at 1086 (Gee, J., specially concurring).
261 To be sure, as Professor Varat correctly points out, these items are not literally
inexhaustible. Varat, supra note 9, at 532. Non-residents' vehicles may potentially
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Allowing non-residents to use such goods does not diminish their availability
for citizens, Non-resident use of roadways or state parks, for example, does
not preclude residents from driving their vehicles on the state highways or
availing themselves of the benefits of state parks. For the state, then, to
exclude non-residents from state highways or parks is "gratuitous. '262 For
that reason, the investment capture defense provides no refuge for state
efforts to reserve such state-created goods or services exclusively for their
own residents.
To be sure, it is theoretically possible that, at some point, the use of a
particular good or service by residents and non-residents alike might become
so great that the additional use by non-residents could be said to effectively
preclude state citizens from availing themselves of the particular good or
service. For example, traffic congestion could become so bad that, even if
most vehicles were owned by residents, the marginal increase in congestion
caused by non-residents could result in grid-lock and thereby deny residents
use of roads they have created. At this point, the otherwise inexhaustible
good or service could be said to be exhausted. Would it then be permissible
for the state to exclude non-residents so as to return the good or service to
working order?
My answer is something of a punt. One would hope that the state would
use non-discriminatory alternatives to reduce congestion, such as New York
City's proposal to impose a congestion-based user fee for driving into the
business district in Manhattan, but the Dormant Commerce Clause would not
require that it do so. At the same time, however, the Dormant Commerce
Clause is concerned only with interstate equality with respect to commerce.
Discriminatory restraints on some inexhaustible goods would implicate other
constitutional values that are protected by other provisions, such as the right
to travel (for roads) 263 and the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause
(for courts).2 64 Thus, while discriminatory restraints on non-resident usage in
times of severe congestion might not offend the Dormant Commerce Clause,
political and other constitutional constraints would appropriately prevent
worsen traffic congestion, reduce highway safety, and/or, at a minimum, impose
additional wear and tear on the roadway. But these costs are qualitatively different from
and less important than the denial of access altogether. A state has a legitimate interest in
ensuring that its citizens may use such goods; it does not have an interest in ensuring that
they can use them free of any and all interference from outsiders. Thus, for example, had
South Dakota produced sufficient cement to satisfy in-state and out-of-state demand, it
could not have continued to ban purchases by non-residents just to keep the customer
service lines at the plant short.
262 Coenen, supra note 9, at 446-47; Varat, supra note 9, at 531.
263 Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1867).
264 Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985); see also
Regan, supra note 8, at 1200 (endorsing this view).
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states from imposing discriminatory restraints on non-resident use of many
of these goods or services.
V. CONCLUSION
The investment capture model draws a clear line between state measures
that regulate private commercial transactions and state measures that return
taxpayer-funded goods or services to state citizens. According to this model,
discriminatory subsidies, but not discriminatory tax exemptions or credits,
are permissible. Likewise, state preferences for citizens in purchasing private
goods for state use or selling state assets for private use are generally
permissible, but not when natural resources are at stake or when the state
possesses a legal or natural monopoly. Lastly, the validity of downstream
restraints depends on whether the restraint serves to channel a state-funded
subsidy to state residents or rather merely attempts to leverage state market
power to require the private subsidization of such residents.
More fundamentally, the investment capture model provides an
analytical platform for harmonizing the constitutional commitments to
interstate equality and state autonomy. The Dormant Commerce Clause
requires states to treat residents and non-residents alike so as to foster
national economic union, while rudimentary notions of states as autonomous
political communities suggest that states may prefer their own citizens over
non-residents in some circumstances. By focusing the inquiry on whether
state citizens have a special claim of entitlement to the particular good or
service at issue that can only be vindicated through discriminatory access, the
investment capture model gives due regard to both values. State citizens have
a special claim upon those goods and services that they have created-but
only those goods and services.
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